Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 72

Issue 1

Article 6

Winter 1-1-2015

Asset Preservation and the Evolving Role of Trusts in the TwentyFirst Century
Jay A. Soled
Rutgers University Business School

Mitchell M. Gans
Hofstra University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons

Recommended Citation
Jay A. Soled and Mitchell M. Gans, Asset Preservation and the Evolving Role of Trusts in the
Twenty-First Century, 72 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 257 (2015).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol72/iss1/6
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law
Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

Asset Preservation and the Evolving
Role of Trusts in the Twenty-First
Century
Jay A. Soled
Mitchell M. Gans
Abstract
For the vast majority of the twentieth century, trusts served
two pivotal roles. The first was as a vehicle to help mitigate
federal and state estate tax burdens, the rates of which could be
quite significant. The second was to assist in asset preservation,
safeguarding trust beneficiaries from their profligacy, former
spouses, creditors, and the like.
At the start of the twenty-first century, Congress passed
legislation that curtailed the impact of the federal estate tax, and
many state legislatures have followed suit, either eliminating or
significantly reducing their estate taxes. As a result of these
legislative changes, trust instrument reliance to mitigate transfer
tax burdens is no longer a commonplace objective. Instead, the role
of trusts has shifted entirely toward asset preservation, buoyed by
state legislative reforms that facilitate fulfillment of this role.
However, state legislative reform measures that are designed
to strengthen the asset preservation element of trusts are replete
with problems. In particular, they drain government coffers as
they pit states against one another and the federal government;
furthermore, insofar as they promote an aristocracy-like
environment (where wealth cascades down from one generation to
the next), they thwart economic mobility, an essential component
of our nation’s financial fabric.
Using three specific examples of states’ aggressive efforts to
attract trust formation within their borders, this analysis
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demonstrates the shortcomings associated with the evolving role of
trusts in asset preservation and its corrosive effects. Because too
much is at stake for this role to be left unchecked, this analysis
recommends several viable reforms.
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I. Introduction
Over the past decade, Congress has devitalized the federal
estate tax,1 relegating it to almost complete obscurity. As
currently formulated, it only burdens approximately 0.14% of the
U.S. population.2 Moreover, the vast majority of state
governments has followed the lead of the federal government, in
many instances even going a step further and entirely
eliminating their estate taxes.3 These actions by the federal
1. See, e.g., Grayson M.P. McCouch, The Empty Promise of Estate Tax
Repeal, 28 VA. TAX REV. 369, 370 (2008) (“The 2001 Act provides sizable income
and estate tax cuts over a protracted phase-in period, culminating in 2010 with
repeal of the estate tax and introduction of a modified carryover basis system for
inherited property.”); Daniel W. Matthews, A Fight to the Death: Slaying the
Estate Tax Repeal Hydra, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 663, 665 (2006) (acknowledging
that estate tax critics have been hugely successful in their campaign against the
estate tax); Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Estate Tax Repeal:
Through the Looking Glass, 22 VA. TAX REV. 187 (2002) (explaining how
Congress, in 2001, greatly weakened the federal transfer tax system).
2. See Chye-Ching Huang & Nathaniel Frentz, Myths and Realities About
the Estate Tax, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES (Aug. 29, 2013),
http://www.cbpp.org/archiveSite/estatetaxmyths.pdf (indicating that in 2013
only 1.4 people out of 1,000 taxpayers endured the federal estate tax).
3. See Ashlea Ebeling, Where Not to Die in 2014: The Changing Wealth
Tax Landscape, FORBES (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
ashleaebeling/2013/11/01/where-not-to-die-in-2014-the-changing-wealth-taxlandscape/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (indicating that only nineteen states and
the District of Columbia still retain state estate taxes) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). See generally Jeffrey A. Cooper, John R.
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government and state legislatures have led to a fundamental
shift in the estate planning landscape. Simply put, most
taxpayers no longer need to retain legal counsel to circumvent
estate taxes that in their heyday had tax rates—at least at the
federal level—ranging as high as 77%.4
In the aftermath of the estate tax upheaval,5 to stay relevant,
the estate planning bar is struggling to reinvent itself. This is no
easy task. Its membership has had to rethink the role of trusts
and the objectives that they can achieve.6 In the past, trusts were
often employed as powerful shields to protect taxpayer wealth
from the estate tax.7 As the estate tax has waned at both the
federal and state levels,8 however, this objective has largely been
rendered a nullity. Estate planners have thus had to reformulate
the role of trust instruments, placing much greater emphasis on
their second historical objective, namely, asset preservation.9

Ivimey & Donna D. Vincenti, State Estate Taxes After EGTRRA: A Long Day’s
Journey into the Night, 17 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 90 (2003) (explaining how in
the aftermath of congressional repeal of state death tax credit, many state
legislatures simply let their estate taxes lapse); Joel Michael, State Responses to
EGTRRA Estate Tax Changes, 103 TAX NOTES 1023 (2004) (cataloging state tax
policy changes in the wake of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001).
4. See Darien B. Jacobson, Brian G. Raub & Barry W. Johnson, The Estate
Tax: Ninety Years and Counting, 27 STAT. INCOME BULL., 118, 122 fig.D
(Summer 2007), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/ninetyestate.pdf (showing the top
tax rates from 1916 to 2007).
5. See infra Part II (discussing the historical context of the estate tax and
its current state, which shows the drastic change).
6. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Cooper, Interstate Competition and State Death
Taxes: A Modern Crisis in Historical Perspective, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 835 (2006)
(describing the new estate tax landscape).
7. See infra Part II.A (discussing the estate tax prior to 2001).
8. See infra Part II.B (looking at the changes made in 2001 and
developments since then).
9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 25–33 (1959) (discussing the
creation of a trust); ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 1 (2d ed. 1947)
(discussing trusts as a way to keep large estates intact); AUSTIN W. SCOTT &
WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 151 (4th ed. 1987) (describing the
transfer of interest by means of a trust). See generally Lawrence M. Friedman,
The Dynastic Trust, 73 YALE L.J. 547 (1964) (providing a history of trust law in
the United States); George P. Costigan Jr., Those Protective Trusts Which Are
Miscalled “Spendthrift Trusts” Reexamined, 22 CAL. L. REV. 471 (1934) (looking
at the role of spendthrift trusts in the concentrated accumulation of wealth).

ASSET PRESERVATION

261

Consistent with achieving this objective, the estate planning
bar has aggressively lobbied state legislatures to pass legislation
that emphasizes trust asset preservation.10 Many state
legislatures have been compliant, enabling estate planners to
design trusts to achieve numerous asset preservation goals,
including the ability to mitigate and, in some instances, defeat
state income taxes; safeguard assets within bloodlines for
multiple generations; and offer significant shelter from
creditors.11 This emerging trend in the area of trust law has
important, negative consequences for federal and state
governments—consequences that require immediate attention.12
This analysis proceeds as follows. Part II provides estate tax
historical background, including those events that over the past
decade have gutted this tax.13 Part III then details how, in the
aftermath of the estate tax evisceration, the estate planning bar
has responded by enlisting state legislatures to pass laws that
facilitate trust asset preservation and then designing trusts that
can fulfill this role.14 Next, Part IV pinpoints the consequences
associated with this emerging trend and suggests measures that
the federal and state governments should institute to protect
their tax bases from erosion and to secure other public policy
objectives.15 Finally, Part V concludes.16

10. See infra Part III (“In particular, they are reexamining trust
instruments and transforming the roles that such trusts can potentially play in
the twenty-first century.”).
11. See infra Part III (examining how weaker estate taxes have frequently
led to more onerous state income taxes).
12. See infra Part III (looking at how trusts can be used to avoid income
taxation).
13. See infra Part II (providing relevant historical context to the
forthcoming discussion of the estate tax).
14. See infra Part III (discussing the response to the weakening of the
estate tax).
15. See infra Part IV (addressing the result of these changing policies and
proposing a solution).
16. See infra Part V (concluding with a summary of the concerns regarding
the use of trusts to circumvent estate and income taxes).
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II. Historical Background

The vibrancy of yesteryear’s federal and state estate taxes
compared with their current limited impact signifies how the
estate planning landscape has changed.17 Subpart A sets forth a
short historical overview of the federal estate tax and its state
law counterparts prior to 2001. Subpart B then details how
legislative changes in 2001 and the years following have largely
emasculated the federal and state estate taxes.
A. Overview of the Pre-2001 Federal Estate Tax and State Law
Counterparts
The federal estate tax owes its origin to the Revenue Act of
1916.18 This legislation initiated what was then a modest tax. 19
With a $50,000 exemption, it applied only to what were then the
wealthiest estates.20 Moreover, the applicable tax rates were
graduated in nature, ranging from 1% on the first $50,000 beyond
the exemption amount to 10% on the portion exceeding $5
million.21
To complement the estate tax and ensure the integrity of its
base, Congress introduced the federal gift tax in 1924.22 In 1926,
Congress repealed this tax23 but reintroduced it in 1932.24 With a
rate structure that was somewhat akin to that of the estate tax
and a lifetime exclusion of $50,000, this tax applied to inter vivos
gratuitous transfers.25 Congress also provided an annual
17. See infra Part II.A (detailing the historical context of the estate tax,
which serves to demonstrate how much it has weakened over time).
18. See Pub. L. No. 64-271, 39 Stat. 756 (providing for a tax on income
received by estates).
19. See id. § 200 (setting the highest estate tax rate at 10%).
20. See id. (taxing estates under $50,000 at just 1%).
21. See id. (providing estate tax rates for estates ranging from $50,000 to
over $5 million).
22. See Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, 43 Stat. 313 (providing for
a tax on property received as a gift).
23. See Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-20, 44 Stat. 126 (repealing the
gift tax).
24. See Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-154, 47 Stat. 169 (imposing a
gift tax and setting forth calculations for that tax).
25. See Jeffrey A. Cooper, Ghosts of 1932: The Lost History of Estate and
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exclusion, enabling taxpayers to transfer up to $5,000 per donee
free of gift tax or the use of their lifetime exclusion.26
Notwithstanding the estate tax’s modest beginnings, the
country’s need for revenue and the Second World War led to a
series of legislative initiatives resulting in the imposition of a
more vigorous estate tax.27 In 1932, Congress passed legislation
that raised the highest estate tax rates from 20% to 45% and
lowered the exemption amount from $100,000 back to $50,000.28
In 1934, Congress passed legislation that again raised the highest
estate tax rate, this time from 45% to 60%;29 and in 1935,
Congress raised the highest estate tax rate from 60% to 70% and
even lowered the exemption amount to $40,000.30 Finally, in
1941, Congress passed legislation that raised the highest federal
estate tax rate from 70% to 77% while maintaining the exemption
amount at $40,000.31
In 1976, the federal estate tax received a legislative
complement in the form of the generation-skipping transfer
(GST) tax.32 This new transfer tax was designed to curtail
Gift Taxation, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 875, 897 (2010) (discussing the effect of the
Revenue Act of 1932, which exposed more estates to taxation).
26. The 1932 Act clarified that the exclusion was calculated on a per-donee,
per-calendar-year basis. More specifically, Section 504(b) of the Act provided
that “[i]n the case of gifts (other than future interests in property) made to any
person by the donor during the calendar year, the first $5,000 of such gifts to
such person shall not, for purposes of subsection (a), be included in the total
amount of gifts made during such year.” Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72154, 47 Stat. 169. Note that from 1943 through 1981, the annual exclusion
amount was $3,000. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 454, 56 Stat.
798, 953.
27. As Congress strengthened the estate tax, it also instituted measures
designed to strengthen the gift tax. See DAVID JOULFAIAN, OFFICE OF TAX
ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OTA 100, THE FEDERAL GIFT TAX:
HISTORY, LAW, AND ECONOMICS (Nov. 2007), http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/tax-policy/tax-analysis/docu ments/ota100.pdf (describing changes taken
by Congress).
28. See Revenue Act of 1932 § 403 (requiring a tax whenever the decedent’s
estate exceeds $50,000).
29. See Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-216, 48 Stat. 680 (providing
estate tax rates).
30. See Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-407, 49 Stat. 1014 § 201
(raising the estate tax rates and changing the criteria for exemption).
31. See Revenue Act of 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-250, 55 Stat. 687 § 401 (setting
estate tax rates).
32. See generally A. MacDonough Plant & Lynn Wintriss, Generation-
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taxpayers from gifting and devising assets to distant generations,
outright or in trust, forestalling estate tax imposition for years
and even decades.33 On a going-forward basis, taxpayers who
made gifts or bequests to so-called skip people (generally,
grandchildren and more distant descendents)34 beyond a
statutory set exemption amount35 had to pay, in addition to gift
and estate taxes, the GST tax. The GST tax has a flat rate equal
to the highest federal estate tax rate.36
As the federal estate tax (along with its gift and GST tax
counterparts) gradually became broader based in nature, many
state legislatures during this same time period took steps to
augment their revenues, choosing a path similar to that of the
federal government.37 Consider the fact that in 1924 Congress
enacted the so-called state death tax credit.38 Up to certain dollar
thresholds, this credit enabled taxpayers’ estates to offset dollarfor-dollar their federal estate tax liability equal to amounts paid
to state governments.39 With this federal legislative framework in
place, many state governments quickly enacted estate tax laws
Skipping Transfer Tax, 17 U. BALT. L. REV. 271 (1988) (discussing legislative
attempts to ensure that a tax is imposed on trusts at least once a generation);
Joseph M. Dodge, Generation-Skipping Transfers After the Tax Reform Act of
1976, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1265 (1977) (discussing the impact of the Tax Reform
Act of 1976 on generation-skipping taxes). In 1986, Congress retroactively
repealed the generation-skipping transfer tax, replacing it with the version
currently in effect. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1431, 100
Stat. 2085, 2717–32 (1986).
33. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 564–65 (Comm. Print 1976)
(discussing the motivations for changing the federal estate tax law).
34. See I.R.C. § 2613(a) (1988) (defining a skip person for purposes of a
generation-skipping transfer).
35. See id. § 2631(c) (setting forth exemptions from a generation-skipping
transfer).
36. See id. § 2641(a) (setting the applicable rate equal to the highest federal
estate tax rate).
37. See E.M. Perkins, State Action Under the Federal Estate Tax Credit
Clause, 13 N.C. L. REV. 271, 280 n.33 (1934) (discussing state laws providing for
an estate tax).
38. See Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 301(b), 43 Stat. 253, 304
§ 216 (providing tax credits to a surviving spouse in the year following his or her
spouse’s death).
39. See I.R.C. § 2011(a) (2002) (providing tax credits for estate taxes paid to
a state).
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designed to absorb this credit because it came at no added cost to
their constituents.40
While exemption amounts and tax rates fluctuated prior to
2001,41 federal and state estate taxes remained a salient part of
the tax landscape.42 Beyond the applicable exemption amount
(which from 1942 to 1976 stayed constant at a modest $60,000),43
the combined federal and state estate tax rates consistently
exceeded 50%, claiming significant portions of wealthy taxpayers’
estates.44 The modest exemption amount combined with the
severity of such federal and state estate tax rates constituted a
constant driving force toward comprehensive estate planning for
many taxpayers.45
Naturally, the estate planning bar did whatever it could to
keep transfer tax severity in the public limelight and to
emphasize taxpayers’ need for legal counsel.46 Estate planners
routinely warned clients that improperly planned estates had the
potential for significant estate tax exposure.47 Indeed, these
planners routinely exploited examples of assets inuring to the
benefit of grandchildren that triggered multiple-transfer-tax
application (i.e., both the estate and GST taxes) and resulted in
an aggregate transfer tax rate as high as 90%.48 Whether these
40. See Perkins, supra note 37, at 280 n.33 (detailing those states that
adopted an estate tax in the aftermath of federal legislation).
41. See Jacobson, Raub & Johnson, supra note 4, at 122 (providing estate
tax rates from 1916 to 1977).
42. See id. at 122–24 (providing historical context of the estate tax).
43. See id. at 122 (providing estate tax rates from 1916 to 1977).
44. See id. (showing that, despite fluctuations, the top rate was almost
always above 50%).
45. See id. at 121–24 (discussing past estate tax regimes, under which
many more estates were exposed to taxation).
46. See
AMERICAN
BAR
ASS’N,
ESTATE
PLANNING
4,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/practical/books/
family_legal_guide/chapter_16.authcheckda.pdf (encouraging the use of an
attorney in estate planning).
47. See id. at 27–28 (discussing the potential for estate tax exposure,
including the methods of asset valuation upon death).
48. See generally Top Four Reasons You Need an Estate Planning Attorney,
FOWLER ST. CLAIR (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.fowlerstclair.com/top-fourreasons-need-estate-planning-attorney/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (listing one
reason to see an estate planning attorney as having “enough assets to worry
about the so-called ‘death tax’”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Evelyn Zawatasky, Ten Reasons You Need to See an Estate Planning
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frightful scenarios would actually materialize was irrelevant;
they motivated taxpayers to act.
Because of the high stakes, taxpayers were often willing to
dedicate a lot of resources in the form of legal fees to safeguard
their estates from transfer tax. Tax counsel accordingly
developed a plethora of tax-saving techniques, the vast
majority of which employed trust utilization. 49 Some of these
tax-saving techniques involving trusts could be employed
during taxpayers’ lifetimes and were designed to keep
insurance proceeds out of their estates, 50 maximize valuation
discounts,51 and leverage their annual exclusions; 52 some of
these
tax-saving
techniques
involving
trusts
were
testamentary in nature and, among other things, were
Attorney, ZAWATSKY LAW (Feb. 9, 2014), http://www.zawatskylaw.com/10reasons-need-see-estate-planning-attorney/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2015)
(including the possibility of estate taxes as a reason to see an estate planning
attorney) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
49. See, e.g., C. Daniel Yates & Michael O. Chenoweth, Estate Planning:
The Use of Irrevocable Insurance Trusts, 23 IND. L. REV. 517, 517 (1990)
(discussing the use of trusts in estate planning).
50. See, e.g., id. (“An irrevocable trust funded with life insurance provides
the opportunity to create wealth for the benefit of the settlor’s family without
the imposition of federal estate tax and to provide liquidity for the estate of the
settlor.”). For a historic examination of the early use of irrevocable life insurance
trusts, see Note, Federal Taxation of Personal Life Insurance Trusts, 44 YALE
L.J. 1409, 1415–21 (1935) (looking at the use of trusts in avoiding estate
taxation).
51. See James R. Repetti, Minority Discounts: The Alchemy in Estate and
Gift Taxation, 50 TAX L. REV. 415, 431–32 (1995) (discussing ways that
valuation methods might be used to lower estate and gift taxes); Mary Louise
Fellows & William H. Painter, Valuing Close Corporations for Federal Wealth
Transfer Taxes: A Statutory Solution to the Disappearing Wealth Syndrome, 30
STAN. L. REV. 895, 913 (1978) (looking at a case that addressed valuation as a
way to reduce gift taxes); Alan L. Feld, The Implications of Minority Interest and
Stock Restrictions in Valuing Closely-Held Shares, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 934, 947
(1974) (addressing the impact of valuation on fixed estate taxes).
52. See John G. Steinkamp, Common Sense and the Gift Tax Annual
Exclusion, 72 NEB. L. REV. 106, 116–25 (1993) (providing an overview of the
exclusion and limitations on that exclusion); Robert B. Smith, Should We Give
Away the Annual Exclusion?, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 361, 401 (1993) (arguing that
exclusions make it easy to avoid paying estate taxes); Louis S. Harrison, The
Strategic Use of Lifetime Gifting Programs to Reduce Estate Taxes in Light of
Recent Congressional and Internal Revenue Service Antipathy Towards Transfer
Tax Reduction Devices, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 365, 375–77 (1991) (looking at
exclusion gifts as “an effective means to reduce eventual estate taxes”).
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designed to maximize taxpayers’ use of their federal and state
exemption amounts 53 and the estate tax marital deduction. 54
The trust utilization area of the law blossomed and remained
vibrant.55
B. Overview of 2001 Legislative Changes and Current Status of
the Law
For years prior to 2001, many commentators and
politicians called for estate tax repeal. 56 They labeled the
estate tax as the “death tax” and claimed that it was
summarily destroying small businesses and farms. 57 While
their pleas for repeal gained traction in Congress, primarily
due to the sympathies of Republican Party members, 58 the
53. See, e.g., Henry M. Ordower, Trusting Our Partners: An Essay on
Resetting the Estate Planning Defaults for an Adult World, 31 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 313, 347 (1996) (outlining the rationale behind unified credit shelter
trusts); Larry W. Gibbs, Basic Federal Gift and Estate Taxation, 17 ST. MARY’S
L.J. 809, 834 (1986) (describing in detail how credit shelter trusts are designed
to operate).
54. See, e.g., Wendy C. Gerzog, The New Supercharged PAT (Power of
Appointment Trust), 48 HOUS. L. REV. 507, 529–34 (2011) (describing marital
trust use in the estate planning sphere); Joseph M. Dodge, A Feminist
Perspective on the QTIP Trust and the Unlimited Marital Deduction, 76 N.C. L.
REV. 1729, 1729 (1998) (exploring the history of the unlimited estate tax marital
deduction and how it gave rise to marital deduction trusts).
55. See generally Gerzog, supra note 54 (discussing the power of
appointment trusts in the context of estate planning).
56. See Joel C. Dobris, A Brief for the Abolition of All Transfer Taxes, 35
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1215, 1216 (1985) (calling for a repeal of the estate and gift
tax).
57. See id. at 1222 (referring to the estate tax as a death tax); John E.
Donaldson, The Future of Transfer Taxation: Repeal, Restructuring and
Refinement, or Replacement, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 539, 545–49 (1993)
(discussing the unfairness of the estate tax); Charles O. Galvin, To Bury the
Estate Tax, Not to Praise It, 52 TAX NOTES 1413 (1991) (arguing that the income
tax should be increased to make up any deficit caused by a repeal of the estate
tax); Robert B. Smith, Burying the Estate Tax Without Resurrecting Its
Problems, 55 TAX NOTES 1799 (1992) (calling for the repeal of the estate tax).
But see Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J.
257, 274–78 (1983) (discussing the benefits of progressive taxation versus
regressive taxation).
58. See Floyd Norris, The ‘Death Tax’ Lives on Despite Senate Republican
Efforts to Kill It, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2006, at C3 (discussing the failure of a bill
that would have repealed the estate tax); Jackie Calmes, Republicans Discover
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estate tax remained largely intact during the 1980s and
1990s.59
But in 2001 everything changed. In a hotly contested
presidential election, George W. Bush narrowly prevailed over Al
Gore, and the Republicans commanded a majority in the House
and a tie in the Senate.60 While the Republicans harbored
antipathy for the income tax, they expressed even greater disdain
for the estate tax.61 Within a few months of taking office, with the
balance of power in Republican hands, the Bush administration
sought to torpedo the estate tax.62
Congress accordingly enacted sweeping legislation that
fundamentally changed the estate tax and set it on a trajectory
toward obsolescence. Among other things, the Economic Growth
and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (2001 Act)63 gradually
raised the estate tax exemption amount, gradually reduced the
estate tax rate, and suspended the tax in its entirety for a one-

Appeal of Killing the ‘Death Tax’: Good Times Make It Politically Acceptable to
Support Repeal, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2000, at B2 (looking at the appeal of
repealing the estate tax to those Americans whose estates would not likely be
affected by such a tax); President George W. Bush’s Weekly Radio Address, 37
WKLY. COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 12, at 463–508 (Mar. 17, 2001)
(“On principle, every family, every farmer and small business person should be
able to pass on their life’s work to those they love. So we abolish the death tax.”);
Press Release, Sen. Charles E. Grassley (Mar. 15, 2001), available at LEXIS,
FEDTAX library, TNT file (“Repealing the federal death tax is critical to the
financial well-being and survival of family farms and small businesses.”).
59. See generally Dobris, supra note 56 (calling for the repeal of the estate
tax in the 1980s); Donaldson, supra note 57 (calling for the repeal of the estate
tax in the 1990s).
60. See Party Division in the Senate, 1789–Present, U.S. SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm
(last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (listing the majority party in Congress) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
61. For a complete compendium of the Republicans’ current arguments
against the estate tax, see KEVIN BRADY, JOINT ECON. COMM. REPUBLICANS, COST
AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX, AN UPDATE 15–18 (July 25,
2012), http://www.jec.senate.gov/republicans/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=bc9
424c1-8897-4dbd-b14c-a17c9c5380a3.
62. See President George W. Bush’s Weekly Radio Address, 37 WKLY.
COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 12, at 463–508 (Mar. 17, 2001)
(discussing reasons for getting rid of the estate tax).
63. See Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.).
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year period in 2010.64 Due to budgetary constraints,65 in 2011 the
estate tax was scheduled to revert to its original 2001 status;66
however, the vast majority of politicians suspected that once
taxpayers were accustomed to the higher estate tax exemption
amounts (and even a one-year tax suspension), replication of the
“2001 estate tax world” would be a virtual impossibility.67 The
2001 Act also repealed the state estate tax credit, replacing it
with a deduction;68 on a going-forward basis, if states were to levy
an estate tax, it would come at an additional cost to their
taxpayers.69
Late in 2010, with the clock ticking toward reversion to the
2001 estate tax world, Congress enacted legislation that once
again sucked vitality from the estate tax.70 With the imprimatur
of a Democratic president, namely, Barack Obama, Congress
“temporarily” raised the 2009 estate tax exemption amount over
40% from $3.5 million to $5 million; raised the gift tax exemption
amount 500%, from $1 million to $5 million; raised the GST tax
exemption amount over 40%, from $3.5 million to $5 million;
indexed these exemption amounts for inflation; and significantly
lowered the highest estate tax rate from 45% to 35% (its lowest
64. See id. tit. V (reducing the estate tax and changing the exemption
amount so that fewer estates are subject to the tax); Sergio Pareja, Estate Tax
Repeal Under EGTRRA: A Proposal for Simplification, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 73 (2003) (explaining the details of this legislation).
65. For an excellent overview of how these constraints operate and how
politicians seek to circumvent them, see George K. Yin, Temporary Effect
Legislation, Political Accountability, and Fiscal Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV.
174, 228 (2009) (describing how Congress can avoid restraints while still
appearing to comply with such restraints).
66. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-16, § 901, 115 Stat. 38 (sunsetting the legislation after December 31,
2010).
67. See, e.g., William G. Gale & Samara R. Potter, An Economic Evaluation
of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, 55 NAT’L TAX
J. 133, 138 (2002), available at http:/ntj.tax.org/ (“Virtually no one believes the
bill will sunset as written.”).
68. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001,
§ 531(a)(1)–(3) (replacing the state estate tax credit with a deduction).
69. See id. (providing that taxpayers would no longer receive a credit for
state estate taxes levied against an estate).
70. See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job
Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (providing relief from the estate tax).
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rate since 1932).71 Another feature that Congress added to the
Internal Revenue Code (Code) was portability of the estate tax
exemption amount between spouses.72 This new feature would
enable a surviving spouse to capitalize on the decedent spouse’s
unused estate tax exemption amount without going through the
tiresome and expensive exercise of establishing so-called bypass
trusts that, for decades, were instrumental in preserving a
decedent spouse’s unused exemption amount.73 (Bypass trusts
had been the darling technique of the estate planning industry,
often constituting a major justification for expensive estate
planning fees.)74
Congress last revisited the estate tax in the waning days of
2012.75 While Congress had the opportunity to allow the estate
tax to revert to its historical roots (the estate tax exemption was
again scheduled to return to $1 million), it chose a different
path.76 The estate, gift, and GST exemption amounts were
instead made “permanent” at the $5 million threshold (indexed
for inflation), and the concept of portability was likewise made
permanent.77 The only gasping effort that Congress made to keep
the transfer tax system “alive” was increasing the estate, gift, and
GST tax rates from 35% to 40% (not counting the two-year
interval of 2011–2012, still the lowest estate tax rate since
1932).78

71. See id. (offering lower rate and exemptions to more estates).
72. See id. § 303(a)(4) (offering greater flexibility to a surviving spouse in
preserving more of the inherited estate).
73. See id. (providing a way for a surviving spouse to keep more of the
inherited estate).
74. See Ordower, supra note 53, at 347 (explaining the reasoning for using
trusts in estate planning); Gibbs, supra note 53, at 834 (describing how trusts
operate).
75. See American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126
Stat. 2313 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C) (setting the
maximum estate tax rate at 40%).
76. See id. (keeping the higher estate tax exemptions rather than exposing
more estates to taxation).
77. See id. (continuing to allow spouses to capitalize on available
exemptions).
78. See id. § 101(c) (setting the maximum estate tax rate at 40%).
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With the reduction of rates from 77% in 1941 to 40%, where
it is today,79 the function of the estate tax has radically changed.
No longer concerned with breaking up concentrated wealth, it
now merely adds an element of progression to the income tax
system—and, indeed, does so rather modestly given its flat 40%
rate.80
As the federal government gutted the estate tax, state
legislatures did not stand idly by.81 Once the federal government
repealed the credit for state estate taxes, many states
immediately eliminated their estate taxes entirely.82 Other states
retained their estate taxes but followed the federal model of
significantly raising their exemption amounts.83 A few states,
such as New Jersey,84 retained their estate taxes essentially in
their 2001 form.85 Nevertheless, only eighteen states still levy an
estate tax, and pressure continues to mount even within those
states to eliminate their estate taxes or drastically increase their
exemption amounts lest their income-tax-paying populaces move
out of state.86
On a going-forward basis, absent change, the nation’s federal
and state estate tax systems will remain anemic.87 On the whole,
the vast majority of taxpayers have no federal or state estate tax
79. See id. (describing the maximum estate tax rate).
80. See generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
(2013) (discussing economic factors and policies driving inequality).
81. See Ebeling, supra note 3 (discussing changes to state estate laws).
82. See id. (addressing the changes to estate taxes by state legislatures).
83. See id. (providing a summary of changing exemption policies in certain
states).
84. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:38-1 to -16 (West 2002) (detailing that the New
Jersey estate tax uses as an exemption threshold a decedent’s federal estate tax
liability as if the person died on December 31, 2001).
85. See id. (keeping the estate tax law nearly the same as in 2001).
86. See Paul Sullivan, Some States Are Moving to Loosen Their Estate
Taxes, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/25/yourmoney/cold-facts-about-estate-taxes.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (looking at
the motivations for some states to change their estate tax laws to mirror the less
onerous federal estate tax) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
87. See IRS STATISTICS OF INCOME, ESTATE TAX STATISTICS FILING YEAR
TABLE 1 (last updated Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-StatsEstate-Tax-Statistics-Filing-Year-Table-1 (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (revealing
how little revenue is brought in by the estate tax) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
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exposure.88 Evidence of this proposition abounds. In 2012, for
example, the number of federal taxable estate tax returns totaled
3,738, affecting approximately 0.1% of the number of 2012
decedents.89 Consider, too, that the nation’s transfer tax system
historically collected approximately 1% to 2% of the nation’s
overall revenue;90 under the radically transformed transfer tax
system, this percentage amount will no doubt decline
precipitously.91
III. Emerging Trends in the Use of Trust Instruments
With the federal estate tax emasculated and the majority of
state legislatures eliminating their estate tax systems,92 estate
planning bar members must confront significant relevancy
challenges. No longer can taxpayers be induced to retain
professional advice on the basis of ominous estate tax clouds
perched on the horizon. What makes the relevancy challenge
particularly acute is that taxpayers generally want to ignore their
own mortality and, moreover, tend to view the future through
Pollyannaish crystal balls that, in their minds, portend further
estate tax reductions. The combination of the foregoing leaves
estate planning bar members in an unenviable situation: they
possess a great wealth of knowledge in an area of the law
(namely, estate taxes) that has little or no bearing on the vast
majority of taxpayers.93
88. See id. (showing how few estates were subject to an estate tax in 2012).
89. See id. (displaying the data compiled by the IRS).
90. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES (Dec. 19,
2009),
cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/108xx/doc10841/12-18-estate_
gifttax_brief.pdf (“Federal transfer taxes have historically made up a relatively
small share of total federal revenues—accounting for 1 percent to 2 percent of
total revenues for the past 60 years.”).
91. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:
FISCAL
YEARS
2012
TO
2022,
at
85
(2012),
http://www.cbo.
gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/01-31-2012_Outlook.pdf (estimating
that the federal estate tax will generate only $14 billion of revenue in 2013—
less than 1% of the nation’s overall revenue).
92. See supra Part II.B (providing an overview of 2001 legislative changes
and the current status of the law).
93. See IRS STATISTICS OF INCOME, ESTATE TAX STATISTICS FILING YEAR
TABLE 1 (updated Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Estate-
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Because of the radical transformation of the estate tax laws,
members of the estate planning bar have been scurrying to
reinvent themselves, attempting to regain relevancy among the
members of the general public. In particular, they are
reexamining trust instruments and transforming the roles that
such trusts can potentially play in the twenty-first century.
Below, we document three emerging trends in the area of
trust law: (A) the employment of trusts to minimize or eliminate
state income tax burdens,94 (B) the utilization of dynasty trusts to
preserve wealth within family units,95 and (C) the establishment
of trusts to protect taxpayers’ wealth from potential creditors.96
A. Minimizing or Eliminating State Income Tax Burdens
Since 2001, as the federal estate tax has diminished in
importance97 and state estate taxes have largely disappeared,98
state income taxes have generally become more onerous.99 As
state income taxes have increased in significance,100 estate
Tax-Statistics-Filing-Year-Table-1 (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (showing that
very few estates were subject to an estate tax in 2012) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
94. See infra Part III.A (discussing challenges to the residency-by-birth
method and the establishment of ING trusts).
95. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing the emergence of perpetual dynasty
trusts).
96. See infra Part III.C (discussing the elimination of the self-settled trust
rule and the effectiveness of the self-settled trust strategy).
97. See supra Part II.B (providing an overview of 2001 legislative changes
and the current status of the law).
98. See supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text (discussing state
reactions to the federal government’s repeal of the credit for state estate taxes).
99. See Joseph D. Henchman & Christopher L. Stephens, Playing Fair:
Distribution, Growth, and Fairness in Federal and State Tax Debates, 51 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 89, 103–06 (2014) (discussing recent measures that states have
enacted, including several “millionaire taxes,” that were designed to keep their
budgets solvent); LIZ MALM & GERALD PRANTE, ANNUAL STATE-LOCAL TAX
BURDEN RANKING FY-2011 (Apr. 2, 2014), http://taxfoundation.org/article/
annual-state-local-tax-burden-ranking-fy-2011 (last visited Jan. 27, 2015)
(“Nationally, average state-local tax burdens . . . on average, rose from 2000 to
2010, followed by a decrease in 2011.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
100. See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 17041, 17043 (West 2014) (declaring
that the highest marginal income tax rate in the state of California is currently
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planners have devised strategies to minimize their impact.
Achieving such tax savings, however, requires technical expertise
and circumspection. In this subpart, we explore how estate
planners establish trust situs in low-tax jurisdictions.
But before exploring those techniques that estate planners
recommend to establish trust situs in low-tax jurisdictions, a
framework is necessary. States generally treat trusts as if they
were individual taxpayers and, accordingly, classify trusts as
either resident or nonresident in nature.101 For those trusts that
are identified as being resident, taxpayers are generally taxed on
all of their income; in contrast, for those trusts that are identified
as being nonresident, taxpayers are generally taxed only on
income that is sourced within the state seeking to impose tax.102
The rules that define trust residency vary from state to
state.103 For example, some states claim that a trust is a resident
if at least one trustee is a resident of the state;104 other states
claim that a trust is a resident based on where the majority of
fiduciary decisions are made.105 Historically, however, the most
common method for determining trust residency has been based
upon the residency of the individual taxpayer who established the
trust during life or upon death (known as the residency-by-birth
method).106
13.3%).
101. See source cited infra note 102 (examining the statutory approaches to
both resident and nonresident trusts).
102. See generally Warren R. Calvert & Sylvia Z. Gaspar, State Taxation of
Accumulated Trust Income: Statutory Approaches and Constitutional
Considerations, 5 ST. & LOC. TAX LAW 73, 76 (2000) (examining statutory
approaches to the income taxation of accumulated trust income and discussing
the constitutional considerations that govern the validity of more common
schemes).
103. See infra notes 104–107 and accompanying text (detailing various state
approaches to determining trust residency).
104. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1301(5) (West 2011) (“If a trust has
more than one fiduciary, the trust is a resident trust if at least one of the
fiduciaries is a resident of this state.”).
105. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 316.282(1)(d) (2013) (“In the case of a
fiduciary that is a corporate fiduciary engaged in interstate trust
administration, the residence and place of administration of a trust both refer to
the place where the majority of fiduciary decisions are made in administering
the trust.”).
106. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-701(4) (2012) (“‘Resident trust or estate’
means (A) the estate of a decedent who at the time of his death was a resident of
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Most states declare that any trust not identified as a resident
trust is, by default, classified as a nonresident trust.107
1. Challenges to the Residency-by-Birth Method
Over the last several decades, the residency-by-birth method
has been the target of numerous constitutional challenges.108 This
is because, once established, the trust in question may have little
or no subsequent nexus with the state actually claiming
jurisdiction.109
In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,110 the U.S. Supreme Court
indirectly issued guidance in this area of the law. In Quill, via
mail order, a taxpayer made sales to North Dakota residents, and
the state sought to collect use tax from the taxpayer.111 The
question before the court was as follows: Under the Constitution’s
Commerce and Due Process Clauses, did North Dakota have a
right to force the taxpayer, who had no physical presence in the
state, to collect use tax?112 Regarding the Commerce Clause issue,
the court ruled that requiring the taxpayer to collect use tax in
North Dakota and throughout the country would unduly burden
interstate commerce and, as such, was impermissible.113 On the
due process clause issue, however, the court ruled that only
“minimum contacts” were necessary to justify jurisdiction; and
because the taxpayer had a targeted marketing campaign of
mailing advertising catalogs to North Dakota residents, the
threshold had been met.114

this state . . . .”).
107. See, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 605(b)(4) (McKinney 2009) (“A nonresident
trust means a trust which is not a resident or part-year resident.”).
108. See infra notes 110–127 and accompanying text (discussing several of
these constitutional challenges).
109. See infra notes 116–120 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of
nexus with the state as grounds for a constitutional challenge to the state
treating a trust as resident for taxation purposes).
110. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
111. Id. at 302–03.
112. See id. at 304 (outlining the procedural posture of the case).
113. Id. at 309–17.
114. Id. at 306–08.
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In Quill’s aftermath, some state courts have continued to
uphold residency-by-birth statutes.115 Consider the facts of Chase
Manhattan Bank v. Gavin.116 A Connecticut resident established
two trusts, one inter vivos and the other testamentary in
nature.117 The question before the Connecticut Supreme Court
was whether it was constitutional for Connecticut to treat each as
being a resident trust despite the fact that neither trust had any
continuing nexus with Connecticut (i.e., all trust beneficiaries,
trustees, and investments were located out of state).118
Insofar as the testamentary trust was concerned, the
Connecticut Supreme Court held in favor of the state.119 More
specifically, it ruled that there was no due process violation
because the Connecticut probate court had continuing jurisdiction
over the trust to settle its accounts and the like, and therefore the
“minimum contact” threshold that Quill had established had been
met.120 Likewise, there was no violation of the Commerce Clause
because Connecticut’s tax imposition would not likely dissuade a
taxpayer from selecting out-of-state trustees based upon the fear
that another state’s income tax might be imposed.121
Insofar as taxation of the inter vivos trust was concerned, the
Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that this, too, was
constitutionally permissible.122 While acknowledging that
resolution of this issue was a closer constitutional call, the court
claimed that there was a “critical link” between the trust and
Connecticut because the trust’s primary beneficiary was a
Connecticut resident.123
Even in the aftermath of the Quill decision, the
constitutionality of state taxing statutes that are entirely based

115. See infra notes 116–123 and accompanying text (outlining a
Connecticut case that upheld a residency-by-birth statute).
116. 733 A.2d 782 (Conn. 1999).
117. Id. at 786.
118. See id. at 785–86 (listing the issues before the court).
119. See id. at 786 (affirming the trial court’s judgment in favor of the state).
120. Id. at 791–93.
121. Id. at 804–07.
122. Id. at 801–03.
123. Id. at 801 (“There must be some ‘definite link, some minimum
connection between’ the state and the income that it seeks to tax.”).
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on the residency-by-birth method remains suspect.124 Indeed,
several state courts have struck down such statutes.125 Many
state legislatures have therefore undertaken initiatives to ensure
the constitutionality—and clarity—of their resident trust
statutes.126 Under the laws of many states, a so-called resident
trust not only must be established by a resident of that particular
state but also there must be some other nexus with the state—
that is, the trustee, the beneficiary, or trust property must be
located in the state.127
2. Establishment of ING Trusts
With the basic framework for the state income taxation of
trusts in mind, estate planning attorneys have been creating
strategies designed to minimize their clients’ state income tax
burdens.128 A few of the techniques that they recommend are
fairly basic;129 others are more aggressive. One popular technique
124. See infra note 125 and accompanying text (detailing multiple states
that struck down residency-by-birth statutes).
125. See, e.g., Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Murphy, 203 N.E.2d
490 (N.Y. 1964) (addressing an inter vivos trust); In re Swift, 727 S.W.2d 880
(Mo. 1987) (addressing testamentary trusts); Westfall v. Dir. of Revenue, 812
S.W.2d 513 (Mo. 1991) (addressing a testamentary trust); Blue v. Dep’t of
Treasury, 462 N.W.2d 762 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (addressing a resident trust);
Pennoyer v. Taxation Dir., 5 N.J. Tax 386 (N.J. Tax Ct. 1983) (addressing a
testamentary trust); Potter v. Taxation Div. Dir., 5 N.J. Tax 399 (N.J. Tax Ct.
1983) (addressing an inter vivos trust).
126. See infra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing the laws of many
states that require a resident trust to have a nexus with the state, i.e., be
located in the state).
127. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 143.331 (2014) (declaring that a trust will be
deemed a Missouri resident only if it is created by a Missouri resident and at
least one income beneficiary is a Missouri resident).
128. See infra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing some basic
techniques employed by attorneys for minimizing their clients’ state income
tax).
129. Some of the basic techniques require action items prior to trust
establishment. For example, one easy way to avoid state income taxation on a
trust is for the trust settlor to move from a high-tax jurisdiction, such as
California, to a low-tax jurisdiction, such as Florida (which does not levy a state
income tax), and then establish a trust. Prudent trustee selection is also critical
(i.e., avoiding the selection of a trustee domiciled in a state that predicates
taxation based upon a trustee’s residency). See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431301(5) (West 2011) (providing trust situs dependent upon residency of trustee).
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involves locating so-called incomplete nongrantor (ING) trusts in
a state (e.g., Delaware) that does not impose an income tax. The
goal of establishing an ING trust is straightforward: the
elimination of state income tax on the investment income
generated by the assets conveyed to the trust. Actually achieving
this goal, however, requires technical sophistication.
When establishing an ING trust, estate planning attorneys’
objectives are generally twofold. First and foremost, they want to
ensure that the trust in question is treated as a nonresident trust
in the client’s home state.130 They therefore take important
Another strategy that estate planning attorneys routinely recommend to those
clients who are considering establishing trusts and who have children who are
domiciled in different states is that instead of establishing one trust for the
benefit of all of their children (which might subject the entirety of the trust’s
income to taxation in those states that predicate taxation based upon the
residency of the trust beneficiaries, see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54A:1-2 (West
2004) (declaring that trust situs is dependent upon the residency of the
beneficiaries)), they should establish a separate trust for the benefit of each
child to capture the benefits of those states that impose little or no income tax. A
final technique that may avoid state income taxation is to make the terms of the
trust entirely discretionary in nature; the absence of any trust beneficiary with
a vested interest can negate taxation in those states that utilize beneficiaries’
domicile as a metric to determine trust residency. See McNeil v. Commonwealth,
67 A.3d 185, 198 (Pa. 2013) (holding a residency-by-birth statute
unconstitutional when applied to a discretionary inter vivos trust with residency
beneficiaries but no trustees, assets, or income located in Pennsylvania). See
generally Joseph W. Blackburn, Constitutional Limits on State Taxation of a
Nonresident Trustee: Gavin Misinterprets and Misapplies Both Quill and
McCulloch, 76 MISS. L.J. 1, 25–27 (2006) (discussing techniques to avoid state
income taxation of trust beneficiaries).
Even after the trust is established, estate planners may utilize other
planning strategies to circumnavigate the imposition of state income taxes. For
example, if trust situs is based upon the trustee’s state of residency (which is
located in a state that imposes a high state income tax), the trust beneficiaries
can request that the trustee resign. If, instead, trust situs is based upon the
location of trust property, see, e.g., Westfall v. Dir. of Revenue, 812 S.W.2d 513,
517 (Mo. 1991) (holding that owning a small parcel of Missouri real property
was a sufficient basis upon which the state could justify its taxation of trust
income), then the trustee should consider moving such property; if this is not
possible because it engenders title to real property, a solution would be selling
such property and reinvesting the proceeds in property located outside of that
particular taxing jurisdiction.
130. See, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 605(b)(3)(B) (McKinney 2014) (describing
nonresident trusts). Note, however, that New York has enacted legislation that
would limit the advantages of using an out-of-state trust. Under the legislation,
when distributions are made by the trust to New York beneficiaries, they are
taxable under a so-called “throwback rule.” N.Y. TAX LAW § 612(b)(40).
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precautions with respect to such trusts. These precautionary
steps include installing out-of-state trustees, mandating that
trust property be located outside the client’s home jurisdiction,
and requiring that the trust itself have no vested beneficiaries.
Second, estate planners craft the trust terms to ensure that
trust contributions do not result in a completed gift and that, for
income tax purposes, the trust is treated as a nongrantor trust. 131
It is important to avoid making a completed gift so that a gift tax
liability is not imposed in connection with the trust’s creation.132
It is likewise important to avoid grantor-trust status because, in
the case of a grantor trust, all of its income is taxed to the grantor
for state, as well as federal, income tax purposes.133 Thus, with a
grantor trust, all of the trust’s income would be taxed to the
grantor in his or her home state, defeating the purpose of the
strategy.134 To fulfill these objectives, ING trusts often have
several special attributes.
In multiple private letter rulings, the IRS initially ruled that
trust contributions to such trusts were incomplete and that the
trust terms did not cause them to be grantor trusts.135 These
private letter rulings essentially sanctioned the use of these
trusts as gift-tax-free devices that enable taxpayers to avoid
income in their home state on the assets conveyed to the trust.136
But several years after issuing the aforementioned favorable
taxpayer private letter rulings, the IRS began to question its own
131. See id. § 612(b)(41) (describing incomplete gift nongrantor trusts).
132. See I.R.C. § 2501(a) (2012) (“A tax . . . is hereby imposed for each
calendar year on the transfer of property by gift during such calendar year by
any individual resident or nonresident.”).
133. See id. § 671 (describing grantor trusts and tax liability).
134. See id. (describing the tax liability).
135. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-48-028 (Nov. 30, 2001) (ruling that trust
contributions to ING trusts were incomplete and that the trust terms did not
cause them to be grantor trusts); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-47-013 (Nov. 22,
2002) (same); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-02-014 (Jan. 14, 2005) (same); I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2006-12-002 (Mar. 24, 2006) (same); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200637-025 (Sept. 15, 2006) (same); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2006-47-001 (Nov. 24, 2006)
(same); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2007-15-005 (Apr. 13, 2007) (same); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 2007-29-025 (July 20, 2007) (same); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2007-31-019 (May
1, 2007) (same).
136. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-48-028 (Nov. 30, 2001) (determining that
ING trusts were incomplete and that the terms did not cause them to be grantor
trusts).
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analysis in these rulings.137 More recently, in response to a
somewhat different drafting approach, the IRS has again
endorsed the strategy, ruling that the trust terms in question
would neither trigger a taxable gift nor be categorized as a
grantor trust.138
Evident by the amount of time, energy, and resources that
estate planning attorneys have devoted to ING trust
development, there is little doubt that they must achieve
significant tax savings.139 Over the last decade and half, the
estate planning bar has reconceived the role of the trust from
that of an estate tax savior to that of an income tax savior.140 By
redesigning the role of trust instruments, the estate planning bar
has been able to resurrect its relevancy.
B. Preserving Wealth Within Family Bloodlines
The trust evolution did not stop with income tax
minimization or elimination. In seeking to develop methods of
trust utilization to appeal to its expanding client base, the estate
planning bar designed dynasty trusts to preserve wealth within
family bloodlines.141
137. See Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., Chief Counsel Seeking
Comment on Gift Tax Consequences of Trusts Employing Distribution
Committee (July 9, 2007) (No. 2007-127) (questioning its own prior sanctions of
the use of ING trusts as gift-tax-free devices).
138. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2013-10-002 (Nov. 12, 2013) (showing that the
taxpayer established an irrevocable trust). With the taxpayer’s consent,
principal and income distributions could be made to the taxpayer or issue (but
only with the approval of a distribution committee comprised of the taxpayer
and the taxpayer’s sons); without the taxpayer’s consent, principal and income
distributions could be made to the taxpayer or issue (but only with the
unanimous approval of the distribution committee members, excluding the
taxpayer); in a nonfiduciary capacity, the taxpayer could make principal
distributions among the grantor’s issue for their health, education,
maintenance, and support; and the taxpayer retained a limited testamentary
power of appointment. Id.
139. See Richard W. Nenno, Planning to Minimize or Avoid State Income
Taxation on Trusts, 34 ACTEC J. 131, 146 (2008) (presenting an excellent
summary of how properly established trusts in the “right jurisdictions” can yield
tremendous state income tax savings).
140. See id. (summarizing how properly established trusts can yield
tremendous state income tax savings).
141. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing the emergence of perpetual dynasty
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1. The Rule Against Perpetuities and the GST Tax
For centuries, what is known as the rule against perpetuities
placed timing limits on the vesting of property interests.142 In
essence, the rule required that vesting had to occur within
twenty-one years of a life (or lives) in being.143 Its purpose was to
prevent the negative economic and interpersonal consequences
that would ensue were the property subject to restrictions of a
problematic duration.144
Application of the rule against perpetuities often meant that
trust property would vest at least once every one hundred years
or so. Consider the following fact pattern: Assume that under the
terms of a decedent’s will, the decedent established a trust for the
lifetime benefit of his descendants. Assume further that, at the
time of the decedent’s death, the youngest of his descendants was
his one-year-old grandchild. Properly drafted, the trust would
terminate twenty-one years after the death of this grandchild,
which, assuming the grandchild died at the age of eighty, would
enable the trust to remain intact for 101 years.
Aside from the rule against perpetuities, the GST tax was
designed to eliminate the estate tax advantages offered by longterm trusts, which defer estate tax imposition.145 The GST tax is
a tax that applies in addition to federal gift and estate taxes. 146
trusts).
142. See infra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing the function of
the rule against perpetuities (RAP)).
143. See Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule
Against Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097, 2098–99
(2003) [hereinafter Sterk, Judicial Interpretation] (discussing reaction to the
abolishment of the RAP) (quoting JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES 191 (4th ed. 1942) (“No interest is good unless it must vest, if at
all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the
interest.”)).
144. See Heather M. Marshall, Instead of Asking “When,” Ask “How”: Why
the Rule Against Perpetuities Should Not Apply to Rights of First Refusal, 44
NEW ENG. L. REV. 763, 766 (2010) (providing background information regarding
prohibitions against restraints on property rights and the right of first refusal);
Lewis M. Simes, The Policy Against Perpetuities, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 707, 708–12
(1955) (discussing the public policy reasons behind the RAP).
145. It seems logical, therefore, to expect the enactment of the GST tax to
diminish interest in creating such long-term trusts. Ironically, just the opposite
has occurred.
146. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (noting that the GST was a
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As noted earlier, the Code triggers its application when property
passes to or for the benefit of so-called skip persons, i.e.,
generally, people two or more generations removed from the
transferor, such as a grandchild or a great-grandchild.147
Designed to act as a surrogate for the estate tax that would
otherwise be imposed on the children’s generation, the GST tax
seeks to prevent taxpayers from circumventing the principle that
the estate tax should be imposed once per generation and thereby
safeguards the integrity of the estate tax.148 The GST tax rate has
always been flat, equal to the highest marginal federal estate tax
rate.149
To illustrate GST tax application, consider a case where the
decedent establishes a testamentary trust for the benefit of his
children, after which the trust corpus passes in further trust for
the benefit of his grandchildren and great-grandchildren. At the
death of the decedent’s last surviving child, the trust experiences
what the Code identifies as a taxable termination and, as such,
would be subject to GST tax.150 However, if the decedent had
allocated his entire GST tax exemption of $5.34 million (the
current exemption amount) to the trust and if the value of the
assets transferred to the trust did not exceed this amount, the
trust would remain permanently free of GST tax. Thus, even if
the trust were to remain intact for, say, five hundred years, no
complement to the federal estate tax).
147. See I.R.C. § 2613(a) (2012) (“For purposes of this chapter, the term ‘skip
person’ means . . . a natural person assigned to a generation which is 2 or more
generations below the generation assignment of the transferor . . . .”).
148. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (noting that the GST was a
complement to the federal estate tax designed to protect its integrity); Estate of
Gerson v. Comm’r, 127 T.C. 139, 142–43 (2006) (“The public policy underlying
the GST tax is to bring uniformity and consistency to Federal transfer taxes
(estate, gift, and generation-skipping) by imposing a transfer tax upon all
transfers whether directly to an immediate succeeding generation or to
generations further removed from the transferor.”), aff’d, 507 F.3d 435 (6th Cir.
2007).
149. See I.R.C. § 2641(a)(1) (“For purposes of this chapter, the term
‘applicable rate’ means, with respect to any generation-skipping transfer, the
product of . . . the maximum Federal estate tax rate, and . . . the inclusion ratio
with respect to the transfer.”).
150. See id. § 2612(a) (“For purposes of this chapter, the term ‘taxable
termination’ means the termination (by death, lapse of time, release of power, or
otherwise) of an interest in property held in a trust . . . .”).
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GST tax would ever be imposed. And, if properly drafted, the
trust’s assets would likewise not be subject to tax in the estates of
any of the descendants. The longer the trust remained in
existence, the greater the tax savings the exemption would
produce.
2. The Downfall of the Rule Against Perpetuities and the GST
Tax
To optimize the tax savings, therefore, it was necessary to
locate such GST-exempt trusts in jurisdictions permitting
perpetual trusts. Thus began the search for jurisdictions willing
to eliminate the rule against perpetuities. The estate planning
bar found state legislatures extraordinarily receptive.151 Why did
a rule that appeared so deeply engrained in the law’s fabric
become unwoven so quickly? With the promise that rule against
perpetuities elimination would attract massive amounts of capital
investment, state legislatures readily jumped on the repeal
bandwagon.152 Once one state repealed its rule against
perpetuities, other states, fearful of losing capital investments,
quickly followed suit.153 Today, the vast majority of states have
either repealed or greatly curtailed their rule against
perpetuities.154

151. See infra notes 152–154 and accompanying text (discussing the
overwhelming cooperation by states in eliminating the RAP from estate
planning).
152. See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Perpetuities or Taxes?
Explaining the Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2465, 2474
(2006) (discussing the multiple states that followed Delaware in its repeal of the
RAP as applied to interests in trusts); Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M.
Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical
Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 404 (2005) (“Within the
timeframe of our sample, 17 states abolished the RAP with a resulting average
increase of $6 billion in trust assets per state.”).
153. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (noting the domino effect
among states to repeal the RAP as applied to interests in trusts).
154. See, e.g., Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom
of Disposition, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 643, 668 (2014) (“Most strikingly, as a
consequence of the competition across the states for trust business, more than
half the states have abrogated the Rule to allow for a perpetual trust.” (emphasis
added)).
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For two reasons, the GST tax has likewise lost its vibrancy.
First, like the federal estate tax applicable exclusion amount,155
the GST exemption amount has increased vastly in size from $1.5
million (in 2005) to $5.34 million (in 2014)156 and is annually
adjusted upward for inflation.157 This bountiful GST exemption
amount enables married couples to transfer massive amounts of
wealth into trusts that are entirely insulated from any transfer
tax for generations to come. Second, federal estate tax rates have
changed from graduated to flat.158 Historically, federal estate tax
rates have been steeply graduated and the GST tax rate has
always equaled the highest federal estate tax percentage,159
routinely dissuading long-term trust creation. Now, however,
because the federal estate tax rate is flat (currently set at 40%),160
GST tax imposition often inflicts no greater financial burden than
had the federal estate tax itself been imposed.
3. The Rise of Dynasty Trusts
With the rule against perpetuities eliminated in many states
and the application and impact of the GST tax neutered, the
estate planning bar has begun to tout so-called dynasty trusts.161
155. See I.R.C. § 2010(c)(2) (2012) (declaring that the applicable exclusion
amount is at least $5 million).
156. See id. § 2631(c) (explaining that the GST exemption amount “shall be
equal to the basic exclusion amount” used to calculate the federal estate tax
applicable exclusion amount).
157. See Rev. Proc. 2013-15, § 2.13 (confirming that the basic exclusion
amount against estate tax for an estate of any decedent dying during calendar
year 2013 is $5.25 million, proving that it continues to be indexed for inflation).
158. See infra note 160 and accompanying text (noting that the federal
estate tax rate is now flat and currently set at 40%).
159. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (noting that the GST tax has
a flat rate equal to the highest federal estate tax rate).
160. See I.R.C. § 2001(c) (detailing the rate schedule for the federal estate
tax).
161. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND
ESTATES 897 (2013) (reproducing an advertisement from a South Dakota trust
company, highlighting the fact that South Dakota has repealed its rule against
perpetuities). See generally Joshua C. Tate, Perpetual Trusts and the Settlor’s
Intent, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 595, 602–26 (2005) (examining perpetual dynasty
trusts through the lens of settlor intent); Joel C. Dobris, The Death of the Rule
Against Perpetuities, or the RAP Has No Friends—An Essay, 35 REAL PROP.

ASSET PRESERVATION

285

The terms of these trusts are unprecedented in the field of trust
law: they are designed to last generations to come and, depending
upon GST exemption allocation, will escape transfer tax
application over this same period of time.162 Aside from the
transfer tax benefits that such trusts offer, the estate planning
bar flaunts the fact that the establishment of such trusts can
serve as a viable mechanism to essentially immortalize the
settlor.163
Because of the elongated time period that such trusts are
supposed to remain in existence, the estate planning bar has
engrafted such trusts with an immense amount of flexibility.164
Common trust provisions include lifetime and testamentary
special powers of appointment bestowed on trust beneficiaries,
the ability of the trustee to change trust situs, and designation of
trust protectorates to ensure ample investment oversight.165
Made out of whole cloth, dynasty trusts constitute an innovative
new offering unique to a world in which trusts have always been
of limited duration.
C. Protecting Assets from Creditors
In general, creditors of a trust beneficiary cannot reach trust
assets when the instrument or a statutory default rule confers
spendthrift protection on the trust.166 However, under an
important exception—known as the “self-settled trust rule”167—

PROB. & TR. J. 601, 614–21 (2000) (analyzing the RAP’s decline as society’s
attitudes toward aggregations of wealth in perpetual trusts have grown more
favorable); Note, Dynasty Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 2588, 2595–609 (2003) (offering a framework for assessing both the impact
and the desirability of getting rid of the RAP, and discussing dynasty trusts).
162. See supra note 161 (discussing the attributes of perpetual dynasty
trusts).
163. See supra note 161.
164. See supra note 161.
165. See supra note 161.
166. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 (2003) (setting forth the
spendthrift concept).
167. See Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the
Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1043 (2000) [hereinafter Sterk, Asset
Protection Trusts] (discussing the self-settled trust rule).
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the settlor’s creditors are permitted to reach trust assets to the
extent of the settlor’s interest in the trust.168
Common law,169 as well as statutory law in some states,170
sets forth the parameters of the self-settled trust rule. This rule
essentially provides that if the terms of a trust give the trustee
discretion to distribute the entire trust to the settlor, the settlor’s
creditor could reach all of the trust’s assets even if the trustee
were unwilling to exercise discretion in favor of the settlor or the
creditors; on the other hand, if the trust terms permit only the
trust’s income to be distributed to the settlor, a creditor could
only reach the trust’s income and not its principal.171 Not only
does the self-settled rule pose creditor-protection issues, it is also
problematic from another perspective: under the federal estate
tax, because creditors have direct access to the assets of selfsettled trusts, such access causes the trust’s assets to be treated
for estate tax purposes as if owned by the settlor, resulting in
estate tax inclusion of all of the posttransfer appreciation.172
1. Elimination of the Self-Settled Trust Rule
In the 1990s, the estate planning bar recognized that if the
self-settled trust rule were eliminated, self-settled trusts could

168. See, e.g., GRISWOLD, supra note 9, § 282.1 (“It is almost universally held
that a person cannot create an effective spendthrift trust for his own
benefit . . . .”).
169. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156 (1959) (denying creditor
protection in the case of a self-settled trust); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 60 cmt. f (2003) (same).
170. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-3.1 (2005) (codifying the
common law approach).
171. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 cmt. f (2003) (indicating that
the creditors could reach the maximum amount that could be distributed to the
settlor).
172. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b)(2) (requiring inclusion in the gross estate
where assets transferred in trust could be used as a matter of state law to
discharge the settlor’s legal obligation); Rev. Rul. 76-103, 1976-1 C.B. 293
(finding a gift incomplete for tax purposes based on the ability of the settlor’s
creditors under state law to reach the assets of a self-settled trust); Estate of
Paxton v. Comm’r, 86 T.C. 785 (1986) (applying I.R.C. § 2036 to include assets in
a self-settled trust in the settlor’s gross estate based on the self-settled trust
rule under applicable state law).
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possibly provide two valuable strategic advantages.173 First, a
settlor concerned about the possibility of future creditors could
establish a self-settled trust without having to surrender
permanent and unequivocal access to the assets, which is
ordinarily the case when an outright gift is used for creditorprotection purposes.174 Second, a self-settled trust could offer an
ability to minimize estate tax liability while still allowing the
settlor to retain indirect control of his or her assets.
In light of these strategic advantages, starting in Alaska, the
estate planning bar—along with other professionals, particularly
from the banking industry—mobilized and successfully lobbied
for legislation that would overrule the self-settled trust rule.175 By
designating an Alaskan trustee, making the trust irrevocable,
inserting a spendthrift provision, and invoking choice-of-law
provision making Alaskan law controlling in the trust
instrument, nonresidents could seek to avoid the self-settled trust
rule in their home state.176 Thus, for example, a person residing
173. See, e.g., Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts, supra note 167, at 1035–40
(discussing the earlier use of such trusts in an offshore context and their later
evolution in the domestic context).
174. All outright gifts as well as gifts in trust can be set aside by creditors if
the gift constitutes a fraudulent conveyance or transfer. See Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act, 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 4, prefatory n. (2006) (setting out this
rule). Thus, if the gift or transfer in trust is made at a time when claims have
already been asserted, the creditor may well be able to collect from the
transferee. Yet, if no claim is pending or foreseeable at the time of the
gift/transfer, it is unclear whether such a transfer constitutes a fraudulent
conveyance. The applicability of these statutes is unclear. Courts have
nonetheless found transfers/gifts invalid when made to hinder or delay a future
creditor. See, e.g., United States v. Chapman, 756 F.2d 1237, 1241 (5th Cir.
1985) (indicating that where a gift/transfer is made with the intent to “shield
the property from debts thereafter to be incurred,” it can be set aside as
fraudulent); Charles D. Fox IV & Michael J. Huft, Asset Protection and Dynasty
Trusts, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 287, 303–06 (2002) (discussing fraudulent
conveyance claims); Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors’ Rights
in Trusts, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 287, 312 (2002) (discussing fraudulent conveyance
claims under Alaska law).
175. See Amy Lynn Wagenfeld, Law for Sale: Alaska and Delaware Compete
for the Asset Protection Trust Market and the Wealth That Follows, 32 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 831, 850 (1999) (indicating that Alaska was the first state to
enact such legislation and that Delaware did so shortly thereafter); Danforth,
supra note 174, at 312–18 (recounting the history of state action overruling the
self-settled trust rule).
176. See Wagenfeld, supra note 175, at 852–55 (outlining Alaska’s choice-oflaw provision).
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in a common law state who wanted to establish a self-settled
trust that provided creditor protection could create the trust with
spendthrift protection in Alaska. Under the Alaskan
legislation,177 as well as conventional conflicts-of-law analysis,178
there would be sufficient contacts with the state of Alaska to
make application of its law appropriate. As noted, this would
permit the settlor to retain access to the assets conveyed to the
trust while hopefully creating a shield that would provide not
only creditor protection but also negate estate tax inclusion issues
(i.e., because the settlor’s creditors would have no access to the
trust’s assets, for estate tax purposes there would be no state law
predicate for treating the settlor as the de facto trust asset
owner).179
Other states quickly began to follow suit, unleashing a race
among the states to create trust legislation that would be
effective in attracting nonresidents.180 Even today, this race
177. See ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.035(c) (2008) (providing that such a choice-oflaw provision is conclusive if, among other requirements, some part of the
trust’s assets is deposited in Alaska and part or all of the administration occurs
in Alaska); Danforth, supra note 174, at 312 (discussing the requirements of the
Alaska statute for securing creditor protection under its legislation); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 12, § 3570 (2005) (requiring a Delaware trustee and a designation in
the instrument that Delaware law is controlling).
178. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 270 (1971)
(indicating that a choice-of-law provision in a trust instrument is to be respected
in terms of the trust’s validity if there is a substantial relation to the state), with
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 494–95 (2003) (indicating that a state
can constitutionally apply its laws only if there are sufficient contacts with the
state).
179. Compare I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2009-44-002 (July 15, 2009) (concluding
that the assets of a self-settled trust settled by an Alaskan in Alaska would not
generally be included in the settlor’s gross estate unless there was an
understanding, express or implied, under which the settlor would be entitled to
receive distributions), and Rev. Rul. 2004-64, 2004-2 C.B. 7 (July 6, 2004)
(indicating that express or implied understanding is sufficient to trigger
inclusion under I.R.C. § 2036), with I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-37-007 (June 10,
1998) (refusing to address the inclusion issued under I.R.C. § 2026 in the
context of a self-settled trust located in a state that had overruled the common
law self-settled trust rule after first concluding that the gift to the trust was
complete for gift tax purposes).
180. See David M. English, The Impact of Uniform Laws on the Teaching of
Trusts and Estates, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 689, 693 (2014) (“But beginning with
Alaska in 1997, fourteen U.S. states have enacted what are known as Domestic
Asset Protection Trust (DAPT) statutes.”); John K. Eason, Policy, Logic and
Persuasion in the Evolving Realm of Trust Asset Protection, 27 CARDOZO L. REV.
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shows no signs of abating as more and more states rush to join
the self-settled asset protection trust bandwagon.181
2. Effectiveness of the Self-Settled Trust Strategy
Notwithstanding the fact that many self-settled asset
protection trusts have been established in the states that have
eliminated the self-settled rule,182 salient questions remain about
the effectiveness of the self-settled trust strategy. First, it is not
clear that a settlor who resides in a common law state can,
through the simple expedient of including a choice-of-law
provision in the trust instrument, sidestep the home-state
common law approach.183 If the choice-of-law provision is found to
violate the home state’s strong public policy, courts will generally
refuse to enforce it.184 Second, in 2005, Congress amended the
Bankruptcy Code to create a federalized self-settled trust rule:185
2621, 2622–24 (2006) (reviewing the history of asset protection legislation and
indicating that many other states began to follow the lead of Alaska and
Delaware).
181. See Adam S. Hofri-Winogradow, The Stripping of the Trust: From
Evolutionary Scripts to Distributive Results, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 529, 542–43 (2014)
(describing the rapid spread of state legislation sanctioning the use of asset
protection trusts).
182. See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 152, at 380–85 (documenting
the migration of trusts to states that have enacted settlor-friendly legislation).
183. See id. at 412–14 (highlighting that there is not much information
about the effects of statutory changes on the common law rules).
184. See Rush Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Sessions, 980 N.E.2d 45, 58 (Ill. 2012)
(refusing to respect such a choice-of-law provision); In re Huber, 493 B.R. 798,
807–09 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2013) (disregarding Alaska law—where the trust
had been established—and applying Washington law to find that the transfers
to the trust were void as to creditors because Washington had the most
significant relationship with the trust and Washington has a strong public
policy against self-settled trusts); In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. 685, 696–97 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1996) (applying New York law to permit creditors to reach a selfsettled trust that was subject to the law of the Jersey Channel Islands); see also
Gideon Rothschild, Daniel S. Rubin & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Self-Settled
Spendthrift Trusts: Should a Few Bad Apples Spoil the Bunch?, 32 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 763 (1999) (examining the public policy issue); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 270 (1971) (indicating that a choice-of-law
provision will not be respected in terms of the validity of the trust if it violates a
strong public policy of the state having the most significant relationship to the
issue).
185. 11 U.S.C. § 548(e)(1) (2012). For a discussion of the history of the
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transfers to a self-settled trust can be invalidated in bankruptcy
where the transfer was made within ten years of the bankruptcy
filing and with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors,
even if the claim did not arise until after the creation of the
trust.186 Thus, even if the trust is located in a state that has
overruled the self-settled trust rule, creditors can nonetheless
reach the trust’s assets if the requirements of this federal statute
are satisfied.187
To the extent that trust assets can be reached by creditors,
either because the choice-of-law provision is found to be
inconsistent with the public policy of the settlor’s home state or
because of the Bankruptcy Code, the estate tax advantages that
the self-settled trust are designed to offer may prove to be
unavailable.188 Indeed, it is arguable that the mere possibility
that a creditor could use one of these theories to reach the trust’s
assets,189 even if the settlor has no creditors, is sufficient to treat
legislation, see Eason, supra note 180, at 2667–77; Gideon Rothschild, Did
Bankruptcy Reform Act Close the ‘Loophole’ for the Wealthy?, 107 TAX NOTES 492
(2005).
186. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(e)(1)(D); In re Mortensen, No. A09-00565-DMD,
2011 WL 5025288 (Bankr. D. Alaska 2011) (invoking § 548(e)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code in the case of a self-settled trust located in Alaska). It is worth
noting that the bankruptcy section carries the negative implication that it
cannot be used to invalidate a transfer made to a self-settled trust established
more than ten years before the bankruptcy filing.
187. Note that, under the Delaware statute, a person who becomes a creditor
after the trust is established can reach trust assets if there is a showing that the
settlor intended to hinder or delay that particular future creditor. Compare DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3572(a) (2005) (indicating that a trust conveyance cannot be
set aside “unless the qualified disposition was made with actual intent to
defraud such creditor”), with 11 U.S.C. § 548(e)(1)(D) (explaining that the
conveyance to the trust can be set aside if the settlor had such intent with
respect to any future creditor).
188. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2009-44-002 (Oct. 3, 2009) (providing that
assets are deemed includable in the settlor’s gross estate if, as a matter of state
law (or as a matter of federal bankruptcy law), creditors can reach the assets).
189. Some states that have overruled the self-settled trust rule provide
exceptions that permit creditors with special statuses to reach the trust’s assets.
For example, in Delaware, certain divorce-related creditors are permitted such
access. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3573(1) (providing divorce-related
creditors the ability to access trust assets). It is arguable that if state law
permits access to any creditor, even where the class of such creditors is narrowly
circumscribed, the settlor should be treated as owning the trust’s assets for
estate tax purposes. See 26 C.F.R. § 20.2036-1(b)(2) (2014) (providing that trust
assets are includable in the settlor’s gross estate if a creditor, not all creditors,
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the settlor as the owner of the trust’s assets for estate tax
purposes.190
Self-settled trust strategies nevertheless remain popular
throughout the country. In terms of creditor protection, settlors
justifiably believe that creditors seeking to penetrate the shield
that the trust provides should bear a rather onerous burden.191
Establishing that such a shield offends the strong public policy of
the settlor’s home state could prove to be difficult, particularly
when one takes into account the fact that many states provide
creditor protection for self-settled retirement accounts.192 And in
terms of the provision in the Bankruptcy Code, it can only be
invoked if bankruptcy occurs within ten years of the trust’s
creation and, then, only if it is established that the settlor had
created the trust with the requisite intent.193 Furthermore, the
IRS has sanctioned the self-settled-trust concept in one context
implicitly194 and, in another, explicitly,195 suggesting that
taxpayers’ estate tax objectives are safely within reach using selfsettled asset protection trusts.
can reach the assets under state law).
190. But see United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 149 (1972) (indicating
that I.R.C. § 2036 should not apply where the settlor’s ability to access trust
assets is speculative); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2009-44-002 (July 25, 2009) (refusing
to apply Code § 2036 in the case of a self-settled trust located in Alaska in the
absence of an implied understanding concerning distributions to the settlor).
191. See Christopher M. Reimer, The Undiscovered Country: Wyoming’s
Emergence as a Leading Trust Situs Jurisdiction, 11 WYO. L. REV. 165, 194
(2011) (“Combined with the advantages of spendthrift protection, self-settled
trusts are fairly powerful when it comes to asset protection.”).
192. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-3.1 (2014) (stating that
the same statute that renders self-settled trusts invalid in terms of the settlor’s
creditors creates an exception for certain self-settled retirement accounts). The
legislative exception invites the argument that the general rule does not reflect
a sufficiently strong public policy to warrant disregard of the law designated in
the instrument.
193. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (creating a federalized selfsettled trust rule).
194. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (assuming simply that
creditors could not reach the trust’s assets under state law because, in each
ruling, the trust was located in a state that had overruled the self-settled trust
rule).
195. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2009-44-002 (Oct. 20, 2009) (refusing to apply
I.R.C. § 2036 on the basis of creditors’ rights under state law, concluding instead
that the section would only apply if there was an implied understanding that
distributions would be made to the settlor).
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In short, the self-settled-trust strategy remains attractive,
both as a creditor-protection and an estate-tax-savings device.
The estate planning bar has thus developed a sophisticated
repertoire of trust offerings that have come at the expense of
important societal interests.196 Left unchecked, the types of trusts
delineated in this section of the analysis can subvert states’
income tax systems, undermine the remaining remnants of the
federal estate tax system, and leave legitimate creditors
shortchanged.197
IV. Trust Evolution and Appropriate Governmental Responses
Over the course of the last century, trusts established in the
United States were typically designed with one of two purposes
in mind: mitigation of transfer tax obligations 198 and
conservation of property (i.e., protecting assets from being
dissipated or wasted by profligate beneficiaries whose profligacy
would make outright ownership detrimental). 199 But with the
decimation of state and federal transfer taxes, 200 a significant
motivating factor for trust formation now lies fallow. Trust
settlors who once regularly formed qualified personal residence
trusts,201 grantor-retained annuity trusts,202 and a whole array
196. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the generation-skipping transfer tax).
197. See infra Part IV.C (recommending solutions to maintain societal
interests).
198. See supra notes 50–54 and accompanying text (discussing tax-saving
techniques).
199. See supra note 9 (explaining that trusts have been used to maintain
large estates).
200. See supra Part III.B (discussing how trusts preserve wealth in family
bloodlines).
201. See Mitchell M. Gans, GRIT’s, GRAT’s, and GRUT’s: Planning and
Policy, 11 VA. TAX REV. 761, 851–58 (1992) (outlining how taxpayers could
establish personal residence trusts). See generally Jonathan G. Blattmachr et
al., Partial Interests—GRATs, GRUTs, QPRTs, TAX MGMT. (BNA) No. 836 (2014)
(addressing transfers of partial interests in property); Jeremy T. Ware, Using
QPRTs to Maximum Advantage for Wealthy Clients, 32 EST. PLAN. 34 (2005)
(discussing how to create trusts in the best interests of wealthy clients); Ameek
A. Ponda, Using Qualified Personal Residence Trusts, 67 TAX NOTES TODAY 947
(1995) (providing an overview of qualified personal residence trusts).
202. See Lawrence P. Katzenstein, Running the Numbers: An Economic
Analysis of GRATS and QPRTS, SL078 ALI-ABA 779, 781 (2006) (“Grantor
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of other trust instruments203 now lack the incentive (i.e., estate
tax exposure) to form such trusts. As the estate tax threat has
receded, an entire branch of trust formation is atrophying, and
the other branch—asset preservation—is attracting more
attention and undergoing a radical transformation.204
This Part of the Article explores the shift from transfer-taxcentric trusts to those that are asset-preservation-centric in
nature, discusses legislative measures designed to curtail the
establishment of trusts containing problematic asset preservation
features, and examines those mechanisms available to better
align state interests between and among states and with the
federal government.
A. Shift from Transfer-Tax- to Asset-Preservation-Centric Trusts
In the past, asset preservation trust formation was primarily
geared toward safeguarding assets for the benefit of the settlor’s
surviving spouse and children.205 So-called marital trusts were
designed to ensure that a surviving spouse could not gift or
bequeath a decedent spouse’s assets to a new spouse or the
offspring of a new relationship.206 In the case of children, so-called

retained annuity trusts (‘GRATs’) and qualified personal residence trusts
(‘QPRTs’) have become standard weapons in the estate planner’s arsenal.”). See
generally Steve R. Akers, IRS Blueprint for GRATs, 7 PROB. & PROP. 48 (1993)
(describing the use of grantor retained annuity trusts).
203. See supra notes 49–54 and accompanying text (discussing various types
of trusts).
204. See infra Part IV.A (explaining the shift toward asset preservation
trusts).
205. See, e.g., Bridget J. Crawford, One Flesh, Two Taxpayers: A New
Approach to Marriage and Wealth Transfer Taxation, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 757, 760
(2004) (discussing the benefits of marriage under tax law and proposing the
elimination of the marital deduction); Lauren B. Epstein, Note, The QTIP Trust
and the Elective Share Trust: Are They Really Parallel?, 53 FLA. L. REV. 965, 970
(2001) (discussing whether the marital deduction should be allowed in QTIP
trusts); Wendy C. Gerzog, Symposium: The Illogical and Sexist QTIP Provisions:
I Just Can’t Say it Ain’t So, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1600 (1998) (discussing trust
formation).
206. See sources cited supra note 205 (providing information on the martial
deduction).

294

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 257 (2015)

minor trusts were designed to ensure that the assets they housed
could not be dissipated or wasted by a spendthrift child.207
Since the passage of the 2001 Act,208 estate planning
attorneys have discovered that trust versatility could take the
asset conservation aspects of trusts to undiscovered heights and
yield tremendous financial benefits: if trust situs could be
selected or moved to a legal jurisdiction in which the laws were
more accommodating, then it could be selected to seek a state
without an income tax;209 if a trust could be used to protect
profligate surviving spouses and children from dissipating assets,
then it could be structured to achieve the same goals for
grandchildren,
great-grandchildren,
and
more
distant
descendants;210 and, finally, if a trust could protect its
beneficiaries from pursuing a decadent lifestyle, then it could also
be designed to protect trust settlors’ assets from the reach of
creditors.211
To facilitate the ability of trusts to conserve property, the
estate planning bar enlisted the support of state legislatures.
Arguments launched in favor of these legislative reforms focused
on how these trust reforms would strengthen the ability of trusts
to fulfill their historic role as asset conservators.212 In the eyes of
many state legislators, packaging of this sort proved compelling;
as a result, numerous trust reform measures have been routinely
passed and signed into law.213 More specifically, over the course of
the last several years, state legislatures have passed legislation

207. See Eason, supra note 180, at 2622; Erwin N. Griswold, Reaching the
Interest of the Beneficiary of a Spendthrift Trust, 43 HARV. L. REV. 63, 65 (1929)
(providing a historical overview).
208. See supra note 64 (explaining the components of the legislation).
209. See supra Part III.A (discussing reductions of state income tax
burdens).
210. See supra Part III.B (describing ways to maintain wealth within
families).
211. See supra Part III.C (providing an overview of how to protect assets
from creditors).
212. See, e.g., Wagenfeld, supra note 175, at 851–66 (exploring the
underlying motivations of why states adopted asset preservation legislation and
explaining that in Alaska the legislation was designed to attract trust
protectors).
213. See supra Part III (discussing common trust reform measures).
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facilitating trust situs establishment,214 eliminating or
emasculating the rule against perpetuities,215 and enhancing
asset protection.216
There did not appear to be anything nefarious motivating
reform sponsors; to the contrary, they seemed intent on
strengthening one of the historic linchpins of trust formation.217
Members of state legislatures who have passed these “reforms”
certainly appear to harbor no regrets and, in fact, on many
occasions have issued prideful messages of their trust reform
achievements.218
The combination of the recent legislative measures has
fundamentally transformed the trust landscape. By offering
clients the possibility of income tax savings, transfer tax
elimination, and creditor protection, the estate planning bar can
claim renewed value for its services.
B. Recommended State and Federal Reforms
With the fiscal horizons of many states and the federal
government marred by burgeoning deficits,219 legislators must be
vigilant about the challenges stemming from the recent evolution
of trust instruments. The private enrichment that these newly

214. See supra Part III.A (providing an overview of state tax deductions and
eliminations).
215. See supra Part III.B (discussing the rule against perpetuities in
conjunction with the generation-skipping transfer tax).
216. See supra Part III.C (outlining how to protect assets from creditors).
217. See, e.g., Wagenfeld, supra note 175, at 858 (explaining some of the
Alaskan legislature’s motivations).
218. See, e.g., id. at 851 (“The drafters of Delaware’s legislation expressly
stated their intent to maintain Delaware’s status as ‘the most favored domestic
jurisdiction for the establishment of trusts.’”).
219. See, e.g., NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N & NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET
OFFICERS, THE FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES: AN UPDATE OF STATE FISCAL
CONDITIONS, at vii (Spring 2012), http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/
files/pdf/FSS1206.PDF (leaving states to “solve a combined $146.3 billion in
budget gaps over the two year time period”); UPDATED BUDGET PROJECTIONS
2014–2024, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.cbo.
gov/publication/45229 (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (projecting significant federal
budget deficits for the foreseeable future) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
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minted trusts offer often comes at tremendous financial costs to
the public and thus warrants reform.220
In the sections below, this analysis describes specific
legislative courses of action that state governments and the
federal government can use to defeat suspect trust use.
1. Safeguarding State Income Tax Coffers
In an effort to mitigate their tax burdens, some taxpayers
who reside in states that impose income taxes strategically park
income-producing assets in trusts in those states that do not
impose income taxes.221 Utilization of this stratagem can produce
revenue shortfalls in those states that levy an income tax.222 To
safeguard government coffers, either Congress or state
legislatures should take steps to eradicate this problem.223
On the federal level, Congress can institute legislation that
treats any contribution made into a trust—other than a grantor
trust—as a completed gift. In 2001, in anticipation of the oneyear federal estate tax suspension in 2010, Congress passed such
legislation. Embodied in Code § 2511(c),224 this legislation
declared that all contributions into nongrantor trusts would
constitute completed gifts. Had this legislation gone into effect,225
it would have dampened taxpayers’ willingness to contribute
220. See infra Part IV.C (discussing proposed reforms).
221. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Congress Should Impose a Two-Generation
Limit on the GST Exemption: Here’s Why 2 (U. Mich. Pub. Law, Working Paper
No. 205, 2010) (discussing how the GST exemption has allowed taxpayers to
evade income taxes).
222. See id. (“The loss of tax revenue will become more and more significant
as time goes along.”).
223. See Steve J. Horowitz & Robert H. Sitkoff, Unconstitutional Perpetual
Trusts, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1769 (2014) (suggesting that another approach, on the
basis of state constitutions, is to challenge judicially the recognition of perpetual
trusts).
224. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-16, § 511, 115 Stat. 38 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.) (changing the effect of nongrantor trusts).
225. See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job
Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 302(e), 124 Stat. 3296 (repealing
§ 2511(c) and thereby dampening the ability of taxpayers to evade income
taxes).
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assets into trusts that are designed to effectuate income tax
savings. The reason is twofold. As a result of the gift being
deemed complete, depending on the dollar value of the trust
contribution and the amount of the taxpayer’s prior taxable gifts,
there would have been the risk of immediate gift tax exposure.226
Second, insofar as the tax basis of the transferred asset is
concerned, the carryover tax basis rule would apply;227
application of this rule enhances the risk that greater federal and
state income taxes will be imposed upon the subsequent
disposition of the transferred trust asset. However, when
Congress decided to retain the federal estate tax, Code § 2511(c)
was repealed.228 This repeal left the door wide open for taxpayers
to continue to park income-producing assets strategically in those
trust jurisdictions that impose no income tax.
If Congress refuses to take remedial action, states that
impose an income tax can take unilateral measures to try to
protect the integrity of their tax bases. Consider the recent case
of New York State.229 In an attempt to safeguard its coffers, using
the now-repealed Code § 2511(c) as a model, it fashioned
legislation that identifies as grantor trusts all trusts into which
incomplete gifts are made.230 Because grantor trust status
requires trust income to be included in the settlor’s gross income,
New York residents who now establish ING trusts will no longer
be able to achieve their objective.231
Given the fact that Congress has no direct economic stake in
how states vie for trust business, it is unlikely that it will enact
universal reforms. However, as exemplified by New York, states

226. See I.R.C. § 2501 (2012) (creating the federal gift tax).
227. See id. § 1015(a) (establishing the method to determine the value of the
gift). This is far less favorable than the basis-equal-to-fair-market-value rule
applicable upon death. Id. § 1014(a).
228. See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job
Creation Act § 302(e) (revoking section 2511(c)).
229. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 612(b)(41) (McKinney 2014) (adjusting gross income
of an individual resident).
230. See id. (establishing a broad definition of grantor trust).
231. See id. (treats ING trusts as grantor trusts for New York income tax
purposes, thereby subjecting the grantors of such trusts to New York income
tax).
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can enact legislative measures to stymie other states’ competitive
tactics.232
2. Making the Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax Universal
The estate tax is supposed to be levied at each generational
level. To achieve this goal, Congress designed the GST tax to
eliminate the ability of taxpayers to defer estate tax imposition
for decades to come by imposing a tax—in addition to gift and
estate tax—on wealth transfers made to beneficiaries two or more
generations removed from a taxpayer.233 When Congress
introduced the GST tax,234 it also offered a modest $1 million GST
exemption.235
At the time, the adjective modest was a fitting description of
the GST exemption amount because opportunities to leverage
this exemption amount were limited: under the rule against
perpetuities, which was then ubiquitous throughout the United
States),236 the wealth funding these trusts could not cascade down
the generations for millennia to come, escaping transfer tax at
every juncture along the way. Placing implicit reliance on the
rule against perpetuities, Congress assumed that wealth
transferred into a trust would generally vest with taxpayers’
grandchildren or great-grandchildren and then, once again, face
transfer tax exposure.
But from the time when the GST tax first came into
existence, the legal landscape has dramatically changed. The
GST exemption amount is currently $5.34 million and is annually
adjusted for inflation.237 Given the size of this exemption and the
232. See id. (stymieing the benefits of an ING trust).
233. See supra note 32 (discussing the generation-skipping transfer tax).
234. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 1431–33, 100 Stat.
2712, 2717 (retroactively replacing the old GST tax, Tax Reform Act of 1976,
§§ 2006–22, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, due to its complex nature).
235. See id. § 1431(a) (creating the GST exemption).
236. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., OPTIONS TO
IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 394 (Comm. Print
2005) (“When Congress originally enacted a tax on generation-skipping
transfers, it noted that ‘[m]ost States have a rule against perpetuities which
limits the duration of a trust.’”).
237. See IRS Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47, I.R.B. 537 (describing various tax
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fact that many states have eliminated or greatly curtailed their
rule against perpetuities,238 taxpayers are now at liberty to
establish trusts with significant amounts of wealth shielded from
transfer tax imposition for many generations.239
Assuming that Congress wants to maintain the integrity of
the federal transfer tax system and that perpetual trusts
contravene achievement of this objective, there are at least three
legislative measures that it should consider adopting.
First, Congress should prohibit generation-skipping
exemption allocation to trust beneficiaries who are three or more
generations below that of the taxpayer (e.g., greatgrandchildren).240 Allocation of the GST exemption to such
distant generations magnifies the power of such an exemption in
ways that Congress could never have envisioned. Presumably,
Congress enacted the GST tax and the accompanying GST
exemption to enable taxpayers to make modest gifts or bequests
to their grandchildren without these recipients effectively having
to bear two transfer taxes (i.e., an estate tax as well as the GST
tax). The GST exemption was never intended to enable taxpayers
to transfer wealth to more distant generations that taxpayers
would presumably never know (great-great-grandchildren and
more distant descendants).
A second legislative measure that Congress should consider
adopting is a significant reduction of the GST exemption amount.
Assuming that Congress does not want the vast majority of
taxpayers to be subject to the estate tax, raising the applicable
exemptions).
238. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS, at ch. 27, intro. n. (2011) (cataloging state statutes).
239. See, e.g., Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual
Trust, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1318 (2003) (describing problems associated with
perpetual trusts); Grayson M.P. McCouch, Who Killed the Rule Against
Perpetuities?, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1291, 1295 (2013) (analyzing the relationship
between the rule against perpetuities and federal transfer taxes); Schanzenbach
& Sitkoff, supra note 152, at 2476 (concluding that the GST tax created an
increase in perpetual trusts); Sterk, Judicial Interpretation, supra note 143, at
2099 (defining the rule against perpetuities); Angela M. Vallario, Death by a
Thousand Cuts: The Rule Against Perpetuities, 25 J. LEGIS. 141, 148 (1999)
(analyzing legislation abolishing the rule against perpetuities).
240. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Effectively Curbing the GST Exemption for
Perpetual Trusts, 135 TAX NOTES 1267 (2012) (calling for Congress to prohibit
GST tax exemption allocation to trusts that endure past two generations).
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exclusion amount (i.e., the amount that can pass free of estate
tax) is imminently sensible. Yet, increasing the GST exemption to
the same dollar amount as the applicable exclusion amount lacks
any common sense: Congress should not incentivize taxpayers to
make significant gifts and bequests to skip people—primarily
grandchildren and more distant descendants—and thereby
bypass transfer tax for an additional generation or generations to
come.
A third alternative legislative measure for Congress to
consider is the enactment of a federal rule against perpetuities.
The Obama administration recently made such a proposal.241 To
date, however, this proposal has not gained any legislative
traction.242
By not keeping the use of the GST exemption and its amount
in check, Congress has allowed dynasty trusts to flourish. 243
Thus, as part of their repertoire, members of the estate planning
bar routinely establish such trusts. But, down the road, havoc
awaits. As explained by Professor Lawrence W. Waggoner, in the
absence of a rule against perpetuities and a limited GST
exemption amount, the number of beneficiaries that these
dynasty trusts generate is stunning: for example, after 150 years,
a dynasty trust “could have 450 beneficiaries; after 250 years,
over 7,000 beneficiaries; after 350 years, 114,500 beneficiaries.”244
Each beneficiary represents a lost opportunity for tax collection.
Clearly, dynasty trusts represent an astronomical financial loss
for the government.245

241. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2013 REVENUE PROPOSALS 81–82 (2012)
(proposing a ninety-year limit on GST exemption).
242. See Dennis I. Belcher et al., Federal Tax Rules Should Not Be Used to
Limit Trust Duration, 136 TAX NOTES 833, 833 (2012) (arguing that trust
duration is a state, not federal, law issue).
243. See supra Part III.B (discussing how dynasty trusts preserve wealth
within family bloodlines).
244. Lawrence W. Waggoner, Message to Congress: Halt the Tax Exemption
for Perpetual Trusts, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 23, 24 (2010).
245. See id. (discussing the number of beneficiaries generated by dynasty
trusts in the absence of a rule against perpetuities).
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3. Eliminating Self-Settled Asset Protection Trusts
While state law can generally be a critical predicate on which
to base federal law,246 problematic results can occur when
Congress places too much reliance on state law.247 In the selfsettled trust context, in both the Internal Revenue and
Bankruptcy
Codes,
Congress
has
made
state
law
248
determinative. As a result, settlors are free to locate their selfsettled trusts in jurisdictions that enable them to accomplish
their tax-and-creditor-related objectives, producing distortion and
inequity. To remedy this distortion and restore equity, in
determining the appropriate treatment of self-settled trusts,
Congress should make state law considerations irrelevant.
a. Estate Tax Considerations
Recall that the estate tax treatment of self-settled trusts
depends on their treatment under state law.249 In general, if state
law permits the settlor’s creditors to reach the trust’s assets, the
trust is ignored for estate tax purposes, and all of the trust’s
assets are included in the settlor’s gross estate under Code
§ 2036.250 Conversely, if state law does not permit creditors access
and there is no implied understanding between the settlor and
trustee regarding future trust distributions, there is no estate tax
inclusion provided the settlor retains no other access to, or control
246. For example, in the estate tax context, the decedent’s property rights
under state law will often determine their estate tax treatment. See, e.g.,
Comm’r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) (supplying the methodology
for determining the content of state law for federal estate tax purposes); Morgan
v. Comm’r, 309 U.S. 78, 80 (1940) (indicating that the estate tax is determined
on the basis of rights under state law).
247. See Mitchell M. Gans, Federal Transfer Taxation and the Role of State
Law: Does the Marital Deduction Strike the Proper Balance?, 48 EMORY L.J. 871,
876–83 (1999) (discussing the consequences of an overemphasis on state law).
248. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (2012) (“A restriction on the transfer of a
beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title.”).
249. See infra notes 250–251 and accompanying text (discussing the
consequences if state law does or does not allow creditor access to trust assets).
250. See Estate of Paxton v. Comm’r, 86 T.C. 785, 814–15 (1986) (applying
I.R.C. § 2036 based, in part, on the right of the settlor’s creditors to reach trust
assets under state law).
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over, the trust.251 In thus linking the estate tax treatment of selfsettled trusts to their state law treatment, Congress
unintentionally sanctioned the self-settled trust tax strategy.
But Congress could easily defeat this strategy in the
following manner. It could amend Code § 2036 to provide that
whenever a trustee is given discretion to make distributions to
the settlor, the trust’s assets must be included in the settlor’s
gross estate. This change would constitute a significant
expansion of this Code section’s scope: inclusion would be
required even if creditors did not have access to trust assets and
even if there was no understanding regarding trust distributions
to be made to the settlor.252 If enacted, this proposed amendment
would render the self-settled trust strategy ineffectual regardless
of the state in which the trust were located, eliminating the
distortion and inequity that stems from the ability of settlors to
locate their trusts opportunistically in states with settlor-friendly
legislation.253

251. See, e.g., Estate of McNichol v. Comm’r, 265 F.2d 667, 673 (3d Cir.
1959) (concluding that an understanding that is not legally enforceable is
nevertheless sufficient to trigger inclusion under the predecessor of I.R.C.
§ 2036 based on Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949)); Rev.
Rul. 2004-64 (indicating that, in general, I.R.C. § 2036 will not apply if there is
no implied or express understanding and if state law does not provide the
settlor’s creditors with access to trust assets).
252. This would have the salutary effect of eliminating litigation on the
factual question of whether the settlor had an understanding with the trustee—
an often nettlesome question for the judiciary to resolve. Traditionally, the
estate bore the burden of proving the absence of an understanding, but under
I.R.C. § 7491 the Tax Court has recently shifted the burden to the IRS. See
Estate of Van v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1077 (2011) (shifting the burden to
the IRS on the question of an understanding).
253. The proposal would only affect I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1), not I.R.C.
§ 2036(a)(2). Under I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1), at present, inclusion is required if (i) the
settlor had a legally enforceable right to the trust’s income; (ii) the settlor could,
as a result of state law, relegate creditors to the trust; or (iii) the settlor could
receive trust distributions under an implied or express understanding with the
trustee that need not be legally enforceable. In contrast, under I.R.C.
§ 2036(a)(2), inclusion is only appropriate if the settlor had a legally enforceable
right to control trust assets. See United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 136
(1972) (indicating that I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2) can only be applied if the settlor
possessed a legally enforceable right).
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b. Creditor-Protection Considerations
Congress should recognize the fact that even if Code § 2036
were amended to eliminate the self-settled trust as a tax strategy,
self-settled trusts would continue to be used as a creditorprotection strategy.254 In other words, settlors concerned about
future creditors, not tax, would still be attracted to states with
settlor-friendly legislation. As in the case of the estate tax, the
ability of settlors to take advantage of such legislation is made
possible by the linkage between federal (bankruptcy) and state
law.255
Recall that common and statutory laws permit a settlor to
confer spendthrift protection on a trust for the benefit of someone
other than the settlor.256 For example, a father might create a
trust for the benefit of his son and include a spendthrift provision
in the instrument based upon a concern about the son’s ability to
be financially prudent. The effect of the spendthrift provision is to
prevent the son’s creditors from reaching the trust’s assets while
the assets are in the hands of the trustee. Given the
understandable desire of settlors to protect trust assets from
beneficiaries’ creditors, it is a rare trust that fails to include
spendthrift protection. Indeed, in at least one state, under a
statutory default rule, all trusts enjoy spendthrift protection.257
Perhaps because the spendthrift concept is so well ingrained in
state law, the Bankruptcy Code has embraced the concept,
providing that assets in a trust entitled to spendthrift protection
under state law are not available to the creditors of the bankrupt
beneficiary.258 Simply put, if spendthrift protection is available
under state law, it is concomitantly available in the bankruptcy
context.
254. See Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts, supra note 167, at 1043 (discussing
self-settled trusts).
255. See infra note 258 (noting the link between federal bankruptcy law and
state law).
256. See sources cited supra note 9 (discussing trusts as a means for asset
preservation).
257. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.5 (McKinney 2014) (making
spendthrift protection the default rule).
258. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (2012) (respecting, for bankruptcy purposes,
spendthrift protection conferred under state law).

304

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 257 (2015)

Historically, notwithstanding the esteem in which
spendthrift provisions are held in the Bankruptcy Code, the
settlor’s interest in a self-settled trust could not be spendthrift
protected under state law.259 Even if the settlor explicitly
provided in the instrument that her interest was entitled to
spendthrift protection, the settlor’s creditors could nonetheless
reach the trust’s assets.260 Under state law, an important
distinction was thus made between self-settled trusts and thirdparty trusts: spendthrift protection could only be secured in the
latter case.261
This historic distinction between self-settled trusts and thirdparty trusts is absent in the Bankruptcy Code. Instead, the
Bankruptcy Code simply defers to state law, sanctioning
spendthrift provisions if they are respected under state law.262 It
is this failure that has made it possible for states to enact
legislation that enables settlors to secure protection in
bankruptcy for their interest in self-settled trusts. Put
differently, had the language of the Bankruptcy Code made
spendthrift provisions ineffectual in the case of self-settled trusts,
state legislatures would have been rendered impotent to provide
creditor protection in bankruptcy for such trusts.
In 2005, when Congress considered the bankruptcy
implications of self-settled trusts, it left intact the existing
spendthrift provision legislation,263 making it possible for settlors
to continue using these trusts for creditor-protection purposes. It
did enact a new provision, however, under which transfers to a
self-settled trust could be set aside if made within ten years of the
filing of the bankruptcy petition and with the “intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud” creditors.264 But this was a modest attempt to
259. See supra notes 168–170 and accompanying text (discussing spendthrift
protection and self-settled trusts).
260. Id.
261. See supra notes 167–168 and accompanying text (describing the
historical distinction between self-settled and third-party trusts).
262. See supra note 174 (discussing that outright gifts and gifts in trust can
be set aside by creditors if the gift constitutes a fraudulent conveyance or
transfer).
263. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (2012) (“A restriction on the transfer of a
beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title.”).
264. Id. § 548(e)(1).
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eliminate the self-settled trust as a creditor-protection
strategy.265 Indeed, if a settlor does not file within ten years or,
alternatively, is able to show a benign intent in establishing the
trust, the trust’s assets remain insulated from creditors in
bankruptcy.266
As in the tax context, the linkage between federal and state
law results in distortion and inequity, encouraging settlors to
locate their self-settled trusts in settlor-friendly jurisdictions and
giving such settlors an advantage over creditors. Congress should
end this linkage: it should amend the Bankruptcy Code to deny
spendthrift protection in the case of self-settled trusts without
regard to their treatment under state law. The use of self-settled
trusts would thereby come to a quick end.
4. Alignment of Governmental Interests
Among the many things that this analysis highlights is the
fact that states are constantly competing against one another
and, to promote the economic well-being of their citizenry, are
even willing to make legislative changes that are clearly
detrimental to the well-being of the federal government—or even
contrary to their own policy concerns.
This is not something new or novel: since the nation’s
founding, states have enacted measures designed to either
promote their provincial economic interests or to safeguard their
industries.267 And the nation’s courts routinely have had to
examine whether these protectionist measures violate the U.S.
Constitution’s Commerce Clause, which gives Congress exclusive
265. Other proposals would have more severely limited the use of self-settled
trusts. For example, in the course of the debate over the 2005 legislation,
Senator Charles E. Schumer proposed an amendment that would have set aside
all transfers to self-settled trusts made within ten years of filing a bankruptcy
petition “to the extent the aggregate amount of all such transfers exceeded
$125,000.” Eason, supra 180, at 2671–72.
266. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(e)(1) (2012) (outlining the ten-year provision).
267. See, e.g., Kirk J. Stark & Daniel J. Wilson, What Do We Know About the
Interstate Economic Effects of State Tax Incentives?, 4 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
133, 134–35 (2006) (stating that soon after the Declaration of Independence was
signed, “[t]hrough self-centered currency policies, impost duties, and other tariff
measures, states sought to protect in-state industry and raise revenue through
taxing measures that burdened out-of-state residents”).
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powers over interstate commerce,268 and decide whether to
prohibit states from improperly burdening or discriminating
against interstate commerce—a judicial doctrine proverbially
known as the negative Commerce Clause or dormant Commerce
Clause.269 In some cases, courts have ruled that these
protectionist measures do not interfere with the nation’s
commerce in a material fashion; accordingly, they have withstood
constitutional scrutiny.270 In other cases, however, courts have
268. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (“To regulate commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes . . . .”).
269. For exhaustive examinations of the dormant Commerce Clause, see
generally Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63
N.Y.U. L. REV. 43 (1988) (providing “an in-depth defense of the dormant
commerce power doctrine”); Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce
Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425 (1982) (arguing for “a radically diminished role
for both the dormant commerce clause and the Court as its interpreter”);
Michael A. Lawrence, Toward a More Coherent Dormant Commerce Clause: A
Proposed Unitary Framework, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395 (1998) (“The
Unitary Framework does just what its name suggests—it incorporates the
various dormant-commerce-clause principles laid out by the Court and leading
scholarly works and consolidates them into a hybrid unitary taxonomy suitable
for use with both existing and prospective cases.”); Saul Levmore, Interstate
Exploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563 (1983) (“The major
purpose of this article is to show that the distinction between ‘interferences’ and
‘exploitations’ has descriptive and normative value in understanding the judicial
response to interstate trade barriers.”); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court
and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84
MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986) (“The claim I am most concerned to establish is my
claim that in this area the Court is concerned and should be concerned only with
preventing purposeful protectionism.”); Robert A. Sedler, The Negative
Commerce Clause as a Restriction on State Regulation and Taxation: An
Analysis in Terms of Constitutional Structure, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 885 (1985)
(discussing the Commerce Clause as the source of constitutional limits on the
power of the states to regulate and tax entities engaged in interstate commerce);
Maxwell L. Stearns, A Beautiful Mend: A Game Theoretical Analysis of the
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2003)
(explaining the relationship between the dormant Commerce Clause and the
various forms of state law rent seeking); Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 125 (1979) (“[T]his article seeks to
return the dormant Commerce Clause from its position of isolation and
incoherence to be reintegrated with the rest of the Constitution.”); Jonathan D.
Varat, State “Citizenship” and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 487 (1981)
(“Any effort to develop appropriate principles to govern [issues of interstate
equality] should attempt to give each feature its due and should, therefore, be
sensitive both to the character of state ‘citizenship’ and to the imperatives of
interstate equality.”).
270. See, e.g., United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt.
Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 347 (2007) (holding that incidental burden on interstate
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ruled that protectionist measures do materially interfere with the
nation’s commerce, and, accordingly, they have not withstood
constitutional scrutiny.271
But state legislative measures designed to attract the type of
capital that this analysis describes are of an entirely different ilk.
Rather than erecting direct barriers to commerce, many states
have instead adopted competitive legislative measures that
sanction individual wealth preservation and eschew restrictions
on its use.272 Because the nature of these measures is only
indirectly related to commerce—defined in Black’s Law
Dictionary as “[t]he exchange of goods, productions, or property of
any kind; the buying selling, and exchanging of articles”273—they
should not be protected at all by the Constitution.
Granted, the nation’s founders promoted competition
between and among the states.274 Via such competition, publicsector innovations would supposedly arise as states sought to
compete in the marketplace by offering favorable business
commerce that resulted from application of county flow control ordinances was
not clearly excessive in relation to public benefits provided in the form of
increased recycling).
271. See, e.g., City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978) (holding
invalid New Jersey’s Waste Control Act, which prohibited the importation of
most “solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the
territorial limits of the State”); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432
U.S. 333, 353–54 (1977) (holding invalid a North Carolina law that sought to
protect its apple growers); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wis., 340 U.S. 349,
356–57 (1951) (holding invalid a municipal ordinance requiring all milk sold in
Madison to be pasteurized at an approved plant within five miles of the city).
See generally Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce
Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377
(1996) (“In this Article, Professor Enrich argues that these state location
incentives harm the states and their citizens, and that the Commerce Clause
may present the only possible realistic restraint . . . .”).
272. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.5 (McKinney 2014) (making
spendthrift protection the default rule).
273. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 325 (10th ed. 2014).
274. See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’
Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1498 (1987) (“A consolidated national
government has all the drawbacks of a monopoly: it stifles choice and lacks the
goal of competition.”); H. Geoffrey Moulton Jr., Federalism and Choice of Law in
the Regulation of Legal Ethics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 73, 132 (1997) (“In short,
competitive federalism forces governments to be more efficient by improving
services, reducing costs, and better assessing citizen preferences for public
goods.”).
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climates with low taxes and the support of important government
services such as garbage removal and proper sewage treatment.
In other words, state competition would incubate good ideas and
cultivate economic efficiencies.275 This philosophy, combined with
the Tenth Amendment’s delegation of certain rights and
privileges to the states, makes it difficult to imagine the federal
government establishing laws that are traditionally in the state
realm (e.g., Congress defining the parameters of property
ownership in the form of a federal rule against perpetuities).276
However, because the members of various state legislatures
invariably are incapable of metaphorically holding hands with
members of other state legislatures and making mutual
concessions (there are simply too many state legislatures with
different histories, agendas, and cultural fabrics), Congress
sometimes does—and should—feel compelled to intervene.
By way of example, consider the history of state death taxes,
which is emblematic of the difficulties associated with collective
action between and among state legislatures. In the early part of
the twentieth century, state death taxes were a revenue staple for
many state governments.277 However, this all changed when
Florida repealed its state death tax and then ran a wellpublicized campaign to attract retirees to the state.278 Not to be
outdone, other states then sought parity with Florida and
repealed their state death taxes.279 Because a large percentage of
275. See, e.g., David L. Markell, States as Innovators: It’s Time for a New
Look to Our “Laboratories of Democracy” in the Effort to Improve Our Approach
to Environmental Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REV. 347, 353–55 (1994) (stating that
states, not the federal government, appear to be creating the most innovative
regulatory regimes).
276. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 729 (1999) (noting that
restraints on federal power are “fundamental postulates implicit in the
constitutional design”). For a strikingly contrary view, see generally Calvin H.
Johnson, States’ Rights? What States’ Rights?: Implying Limitations on the
Federal Government from the Overall Design, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 225 (2009) (“In
recent years, the Supreme Court has been finding and strengthening judicial
doctrines constraining the federal government in favor of the states, in ways
which have no specific justification in the constitutional text.”).
277. See Eugene E. Oakes, Development of American State Death Taxes, 26
IOWA L. REV. 451, 455–68 (1941) (describing tax measures in different states and
motives for such measures).
278. See Perkins, supra note 37, at 271–72 (explaining the depth of this
national campaign to attract wealthy retirees).
279. See, e.g., JAMES A. MAXWELL, THE FISCAL IMPACT OF FEDERALISM IN THE
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states relied heavily on state death taxes as a revenue source and
the threat of universal repeal loomed large, state leaders—in
particular, William Bailey, president of the National Tax
Association—convened a convention to discuss what could be
done to salvage state death taxes.280 What this convention—and
two subsequent ones—decided was that congressional action was
imperative to preserve the state tax revenue base.281 The
proposed solution was for the federal government to enact a state
death credit as part of the federal estate tax to incentivize states
to enact their own state death tax equal, at least, to the federal
state death credit.282 Implementing such state death taxes would
not constitute an additional tax burden because the state death
tax due would offset dollar-for-dollar the amount that would
otherwise be due to the federal government. Most states,
including even Florida, responded to this cue by enacting state
death taxes equal to the federal state death tax credit.283
The effects of competition can also be corrosive beyond the
realm of state death taxes. Certainly, in terms of asset
preservation legislation related to trust instruments, this has
been the case.284 These “race-to-the-bottom” state legislative
competitions put government coffers at risk while enriching those
taxpayers who are economically well-to-do and who can afford the
services of the estate planning bar. Indeed, trust asset
preservation legislation is the exact antithesis of the kind of
legislation that should be enacted—legislation such that “after
balancing competing interests, it is determined that a societal

UNITED STATES 333 (1946) (discussing the fact that in 1925 Nevada added an
amendment to its constitution prohibiting the imposition of state death taxes).
280. See Jeffrey A. Cooper, Interstate Competition and State Death Taxes: A
Modern Crisis in Historical Perspective, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 835, 851–52 (2006)
(discussing the First National Conference on Inheritance and Estate Taxation).
281. See id. at 856–57 (providing the relevant recommendation of the Delano
Committee Report from the First Conference).
282. See id. (describing these same recommendations).
283. See Oakes, supra note 277, at 469 (“The crediting device made it
expedient for the states to adopt legislation which would absorb the full amount
of the credit that a taxpayer could claim under the federal law.”).
284. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.5 (McKinney 2014) (making
spendthrift protection the default rule).
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benefit can be achieved (beyond the mere transfer of wealth to a
politically powerful group).”285
As this analysis demonstrates, aligning governmental
interests is a daunting task. However, perseverance is critical.
Admittedly, provincial state laws that come at the revenue
expense of other states keep the estate planning bar bustling, but
this is a slim justification to retain laws that produce inequities
and benefit the wealthy, who can afford such services. State
legislatures and Congress must defeat state legislation that is
designed to enable one state to prosper largely at the expense of
other states and the federal government. It is imperative that
federal and state governments remain solvent so that essential
government services are provided. Much is at stake; thus, action
must be taken to align government interests or to force
conformity.
C. Recommendations
1. State Action to Protect Against Other States’ Laws
If the option is available, state legislatures can enact
measures to protect themselves from the revenue-siphoning laws
of other states. As a case study, consider the recent experience of
the state of New York and how it has responded to its taxpayers
establishing trusts in out-of-state jurisdictions that have no
income tax. It enacted a law that classifies as a “grantor trust”
any contribution into a trust that is incomplete for federal gift tax
purposes.286 This law erects a barrier that may dissuade
taxpayers from engaging in this tax-circumvention strategy. The
salient point is that, in the appropriate situations, state
legislatures whose revenue base is at risk are not powerless to
combat the actions of other state legislatures.

285.
286.

Gans, supra note 201, at 882 n.44.
N.Y. TAX LAW § 612(b)(41) (McKinney 2014).
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2. Congressional Action to Further Intrastate Conformity
When states cannot protect themselves from other states’
internecine legislative measures and when such measures have
the potential to harm the government and/or public (e.g., when
critical funding for essential governmental services are at risk),
Congress should institute legislation that spurs conformity
between and among the states. Apparently, in the 1920s, this was
the case with respect to the state death tax, which at the time
was a vital funding mechanism of state governments.287 With the
solvency of several state governments in jeopardy, Congress took
action and enacted a state death tax credit;288 this generated a
groundswell of uniformity between and among the state
legislatures, which enacted state death taxes to match the federal
state death tax credit.289 The salient point here is that, in the
appropriate situations, Congress is at liberty to prod state
legislatures to bring state laws into conformity.
3. Congressional Action to Prevent Financially Threatening State
Laws
In those instances when state legislatures take direct aim at
the coffers of the federal government, Congress should pass
measures that defeat these attacks. Consider those states that
either eliminated or greatly curtailed the application of the rule
against perpetuities.290 The agenda of these state legislatures was
simple: attract capital to their states, even though such
legislation would clearly undermine the integrity of the federal
estate tax.291 To date, Congress has not responded, which has
287. See Oakes, supra note 277, at 459–60 (noting that state death tax
revenues steeply climbed from $710,000 in 1886 to $31 million by 1916).
288. See Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 301(b), 43 Stat. 253, 304
(enacting the state death tax credit).
289. See Cooper, supra note 280, at 860 (“From coast to coast, states enacted
new death taxes or modified their existing tax laws in order to fully absorb the
available federal credit.”).
290. See Sitkoff, supra note 154, at 668 (“Today, every state has reformed
the Rule in one way or another. Many of these reforms, such as the wait-and-see
doctrine, are meant to honor the Rule's basic purpose, but not all.”).
291. See supra note 148 (highlighting that GST tax was meant to bring
uniformity to federal transfer tax).
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enabled wealthy taxpayers to continue to exploit this loophole
and allowed billions of dollars to escape estate tax exposure,
potentially for centuries to come.292 Congress has the ability,
however, to restore estate tax integrity by eliminating taxpayers’
ability to allocate GST tax exemption to those trusts whose
benefits inure to skip people three or more generations removed
from the settlor.293 The salient point that stems from this
recommendation is that, in the appropriate situations, Congress
holds a trump card in its hands in the form of measures that can
defeat state laws that put the federal coffers at risk.
V. Conclusion
As federal and state transfer taxes have ebbed in importance,
the estate planning bar has been actively reconfiguring trusts to
achieve a whole assortment of new goals. While these goals vary
greatly in nature, the underlying denominator is asset
preservation comprised of income tax minimization, trust
perpetuation, and creditor protection. When properly designed
and implemented, such specially designed trusts have proven
extraordinarily adept at enabling trust settlors to preserve their
wealth.
But as trusts have evolved, new and important public policy
concerns have emerged. These concerns include whether trusts
should afford trust settlors the opportunity to circumvent state
income taxes, avoid the vestiges of the remaining transfer taxes,
and shelter trust assets from the reach of all creditors.294 In the
prophetic words of one commentator, such trusts will “enable
affluent people to provide their heirs with money and property
largely free from taxes and immune to the claims of
creditors . . . for generations in perpetuity—truly creating an
American aristocracy.” 295
292. See supra Part III.B (discussing how dynasty trusts preserve wealth
within family bloodlines).
293. See Waggoner, supra note 240, at 1267 (calling for Congress to prohibit
GST tax exemption allocation to trusts that endure past two generations).
294. See supra Part III (discussing trends in the use of trust instruments).
295. Ray D. Madoff, America Builds an Aristocracy, N.Y. TIMES (July 11,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/12/opinion/12madoff.html?_r=0 (last
visited Jan. 27, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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The proper resolution of these public policy concerns will not
be easily achieved; nonetheless, resolution is critical. As
evidenced by this analysis, the estate planning bar has cleverly
pitted states against one another and sought to leverage states’
interests ahead of those of the federal government. This intense
competition between and among governmental authorities makes
the achievement of sound public policy objectives difficult.
However, it is clear that such competition has wrought severe
fiscal solvency issues; thus, state governments and Congress
must take decisive actions to protect the public’s interest. If no
action is forthcoming, trust instruments will continue to evolve in
ways that are detrimental to societal interests, besmirching their
otherwise venerable nature.

